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Differences in role orientation among Turkish MPs 
Elise Massicard 
 
Abstract. Like in many countries, MPs in Turkey are confronted with 
contradictory role expectations. However, in a context characterized by 
high turnover, there seems to be no strong standardization of role learning, 
neither through the main ways of transmission of political roles (party and 
elected offices) nor through the professionalisation of legislative activity. 
This statement makes it even more important to take into account each 
individual’s extra-parliamentary experience to understand how the MP role-
set is interpreted. The basic assumption is that the way individual MPs 
invest the role-set is shaped mainly by the resources at their disposal. The 
qualitative analysis of a limited number of selected cases, resting on 
observation and in-depth interviews, tends to show that the main factor 
affecting Turkish MPs’ role orientation is their relation with the party. Non-
parliamentary (especially professional) skills and relations with the 
constituency also contribute to shape the MPs’ role orientation.  
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Studies on Turkish MPs have often focused on aggregate data. However, the differences in 
behaviour and style of individual MPs are a dimension of Turkish political life familiar even to the 
occasional observer. It seems important to try to grasp these differences in terms of parliamentary 
roles1. 
[2] Because the study of parliamentary roles has mainly developed in Western legislatures 
and more specifically in the US, parliamentary roles have often been defined referring to the US 
model. More recently, alternative role models have been developed for European countries (Searing 
(1994) for Great Britain, Andeweg (1997) for the Netherlands). It seems interesting to ask the same 
questions for Turkey, taking into account the specificities of its institutional system. However, there 
are few studies devoted to political roles in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu 1995). It would, therefore, seem too 
ambitious to develop an alternative model of roles in the limited scope of this study. Rather, we shall 
address the determinants of role-orientations of Turkish MPs.  
[3] In order to understand their role orientation, it seems important to look at the legislators’ 
background. Although it is clearly misleading to infer a direct causal link between social background 
and legislative role, one may assume that MPs’ role orientation is partly the consequence of their 
previous social trajectories and of their involvement in spaces which are distinct from official politics. 
MPs act with practical knowledge, technical know-how, ideological orientations and moral convictions 
that they have acquired during various experiences previous to their investiture. Therefore, drawing 
mainly on biographic indicators, it seems necessary to analyse the resources at their disposal. Which 
forms of socialization and involvement have preceded the mandate (family and local socialization, 
school and university training, career choice, spiritual activities, associative involvement, union and 
political activism, conditions of entry in political career)? What kind of know-how can they invest and 
use in political life (Nay 2003: 543)?  
[4] In his classical work (1978), Fenno studies what he calls ‘home styles’, i.e. how legislators 
act when dealing with their constituents. The author travels with congressmen from all over the US. 
This article, on the contrary, focuses only on the Parliament, since I did not have the practical 
possibility to accompany deputies to their constituencies. Therefore, it deals with what can be called 
                                                 
1 And not in terms of legislative behaviour, which would imply, for example, studying MPs’ attendance, their interventions 
in plenary meetings, their use and the success of law proposals, the content of their political discourse, and their vote. 
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‘parliamentary styles’. However, I adopt a broad vision of the Parliament (Abélès 2000; Nay 2003). 
This work is not limited to the legislative Assembly’s official sessions, but includes all the practices 
that deputies undertake within the framework of their electoral mandate and of the parliamentary 
institution (plenary sessions, committees, working groups, parliamentary groups, lobbies, etc.) as well 
as their protracting parliamentary activities outside the Assembly (missions, parliamentary 
delegations, informal exchanges with interest groups or the bureaucracy) (Nay 2003: 538-539, n. 7). 
As a matter of fact, elective mandates are not limited to deliberative work. They imply being involved 
in social work and maintaining links with different audiences both inside and outside the Assembly. 
Nor is the Assembly isolated from the broader social world. Therefore, I am careful to not look only at 
the floor of the Chamber. This article aims at trying to link parliamentary role orientation to multiple 
investments of legislators, in the formal and informal spaces where the career of a representative is 
being shaped (Nay 2003: 539, 545).  
[5] Answering this question does not imply studying all the kinds of elected people: it suffices 
to observe some of them, the way they act in various situations of interaction (Lagroye 1994). 
Therefore, even if it draws from existing quantitative data, this study is rather qualitative and 
inductive. It is inspired by Searing’s argument that it is preferable to let the roles emerge from what 
MPs themselves say about their experiences (Searing 1994:13, 26-28). The main source is in-depth 
interviews with MPs. Due to the practical difficulty of reaching a larger group who would represent a 
cross-section of the deputies; I have interviewed a limited number of MPs, thirteen in total. I could not 
have full control over the sample since the MPs often accepted to be interviewed only if I was being 
personally introduced to them. Intermediaries - academics2 and party groups – had a tendency to 
introduce me to specific kinds of MPs. This has its importance in terms of role-orientation. Therefore, 
this research can not claim to offer a representative sample. However, I paid special attention to this 
bias and tried to correct it by choosing MPs as diverse as possible. The sample includes MPs from 
different parties, who, in addition, belong to the opposition as well as to the majority. The majority of 
them is from the current (22nd) legislature, but three of them are former MPs (one in the 20th, two in 
the 21st legislature). Two of them had been elected several times, and three have ministerial 
experience. Therefore, the group includes both long-term politicians and newcomers, with different 
                                                 
2 I owe special thanks to Associate Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya who helped greatly with the questionnaire and to 
contact MPs. I would like to thank Amélie Blom-Khan for language revision, Gilles Dorronsoro for commenting previous 
versions of this paper, as well as Benoit Fliche both for his comments and data processing for table 1. 
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levels of party affiliation. The MPs interviewed were chosen from among various parliamentary 
committees. The group includes different professional backgrounds (see the main characteristics of 
interviewed MPs in Appendix 1). The interviews were conducted in Turkish between October 2004 
and April 2005. They generally took place in the deputies’ offices in the TBMM, sometimes at their 
office outside the Parliament, in restaurants and/or at their home. Interviews lasted one and a half 
hour to four hours. When possible, several interviews were conducted with the same person. The 
names of the MPs are kept anonymous throughout the essay3.  
[6] Interviews, with open-ended questions, focus on their biographies, social backgrounds, 
political career, attitudes toward their party and position in the party, personal resources, relations to 
the constituency, parliamentary activities, and their representation of roles. When possible, informal 
and ‘off-the-record’ conversations were conducted with MPs themselves, but also their secretaries 
and assistants. Whenever it was possible as well, I made observation of their behaviour. Other 
sources include information collected from documentary sources such as the TBMM’s website4, 
albums and newspapers. Besides, most MPs interviewed for this study held very ordered files about 
their activity as MPs, gather their speeches, law proposals, question motions, press-books, etc. 
These private archives are quite easily accessible to the researcher and constitute a valuable source. 
Finally, two interviews were conducted with parliamentary correspondents of national media. 
[7] The first part addresses the strong differentiation of roles among Turkish MPs. The 
second part deals with the three main factors affecting the role orientation of individual MPs: first and 
foremost their relationship to the party, then their non-partisan, mostly professional, skills and finally 
the social support they enjoy. 
 
                                                 
3 One of them is a woman. However, in order not to make her recognizable, I speak about all of them as ‘he’. 
4 It is difficult to get precise and reliable sources on the legislative activities of MPs. Those available through the website 
of the TBMM (for every MP since the 21st legislature) are those that the party has authorized, therefore they had passed 
the first institutional step. However, many initiatives are blocked before. 
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I. A broad and under-standardized role-set? 
 
Contradictory role-expectations 
[8] According to role theory, a role is the pattern of behaviour and cluster of attitudes 
expected from persons occupying a given position in a social structure. Wahlke et al. define a 
legislative role as ‘a coherent set of ‘norms’ of behaviour, which are thought by those involved in the 
interactions being viewed, to apply to all persons who occupy the position of legislator. It is important 
to emphasize the normative aspect of the concept (…) The concept postulates that legislators are 
aware of the norms constituting the role and consciously adapt their behaviour to them in some 
fashion’ (1962: 8).  
[9] However, roles are often highly complex and multi-dimensional. According to Merton, 
each position in a social structure is associated not with a single role, but with a specific ‘role-set’5. 
Parliamentarians are an example in point, since they interact with a host of individuals and groups 
whose ‘patterned expectations’ of a deputy’s role behaviour may vary (Merton 1957:368). As a matter 
of fact, the role expectations held by parliamentarian peers in the Assembly, by party activists, by 
constituents or by interest-group representatives may differ from each other, as they may differ from 
the MP’s own definition of his role. Therefore, it appears more relevant to speak about ‘role-set’ than 
about one single, coherent role. 
 
Patterned expectations toward Turkish MPs: institutions, parties, media, and audiences 
[10] What are the main ‘patterned expectations’ of a deputy’s role in Turkey and where do 
they come from? The overall structure of the political system constitutes the casting mould in which 
the roles of MPs are formed. According to the 1982 Constitution (article 80), members of the TBMM 
represent, not their own constituencies or constituents, but the Nation as a whole. This follows the 
Burkean conception of a national, rather than local, constituency – even though each deputy has 
actually been elected by the voters of one particular province (Frey 1965:13). 
                                                 
5 The concept of ‘role-set’ is to be distinguished from the concept of multiple roles. The latter are associated not with a 
single social status, but with the various statuses in which individuals operate. Like everyone else, an MP usually holds 
multiple roles: politician, spouse, parent, conservative and so on. 
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[11] How media construct MPs is of great importance in the formation of role ascriptions, 
since media constitute the main channel of visibility. How does MPs’ exposure to media shape their 
role-set? It is important to note that Turkish MPs are strongly exposed to the media’s scrutiny. 
Accredited parliament correspondents (parlamento muhabiri) follow almost all legislative activities 
taking place in the Parliament: plenary sessions, committee meetings, and most of the political group 
meetings. But they also have access to the backstage (kulis), the place just outside the main floor of 
the Chamber, where MPs go out of the plenary sessions to make a break or bargain, and where they 
speak more freely. The kulis is a very good place to grasp news for journalists6. It has such an 
importance that some parties regularly attempt to forbid them access to the kulis7. In the end, the 
Assembly is much more exposed to the media’s scrutiny than other institutions (government, 
bureaucracy or military)8. Besides, parliamentary coverage has quite an important place in political 
news-making. This scrutiny leads to a tight control of MPs’ individual behaviour, resulting in strong 
criticism in case of unruly behaviour9 (Aslan-Akman 2005).  
[12] Besides being defined by institutions and the media’s expectations, the MPs’ role-set is 
also shaped by the expectations emanating from different audiences with which deputies are in 
contact. As far as constituents are concerned, it is the service and allocational aspects of 
responsiveness that compose the most frequent demands to MPs (Hazama 2005). Kalaycıoğlu 
argues that the major tasks of a deputy are: promoting the interests of his constituents, protecting 
them against the challenges of public bureaucracy and providing jobs to his electoral supporters 
(1995: 48-54). Constituents may ask MPs things which are not among their legal attributions, or even 
are opposed to them: ‘if you explain there are rules to get a visa and don’t provide them one, they’ll 
say ‘this guy was of no use’’10. As a matter of fact, the very core of being a representative is to 
interact with various social spheres, which implicates being able to play different roles. Whatever the 
MP’s dominant characteristics are, he has to take into account the plurality of his roles (Lagroye 
1994). Turkish MPs – like politicians elsewhere, and maybe more - face contradictory expectations. 
                                                 
6 Interview with the head of Hürriyet Parliament office, Ankara, November 1st, 2004. 
7 Interview with the chairman of the Parlamento Muhabirleri Derneği, Ankara, November 3rd, 2004. 
8 This fact might partly explain the lack of confidence of the general public in the Assembly. MPs are often held 
responsible for all odds, not because they are very powerful, but because they are more exposed to public scrutiny. 
9 For example, in July 2005, two MPs were strongly criticized by all media for having used their guns to shoot in the air 
during a wedding. This scandal resulted in initiatives to forbid MPs to carry arms. See ‘Silah atan milletvekili basını 
suçladı’, Vatan, 27/07/2005. 
10 Interview, MP E, Ankara, 24/04/2005. 
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[13] The role expectations that Turkish MPs face are contradictory because different 
audiences express them. Yet, even the role expectations carried by the media are contradictory. 
Parliament correspondents pay attention only to aspects of the MPs’ activity that they consider 
noteworthy and ‘newsworthy’, i.e. in relation with perceived current policy issues. They maintain 
relations mainly with MPs who are best informed. These are mainly MPs who already enjoy power 
positions (being in the bureau of the Assembly, in the party boards, in the direction of party groups, or 
in committee boards), or MPs who are very active in committee or legislative work. The head of 
Hürriyet Parliament office declares knowing 100 or 150 MPs because ‘they are the people who are 
continually in the job and are susceptible to produce news. That’s why we know them better’11. Most 
parliament correspondents do not know the other MPs. This means that parliament correspondents 
put an overstated value on legislative work and MPs engaging in it. In order to appear in public media 
– which is considered important for re-election by most MPs (Hazama 2005: § 19-20) – MPs have to 
engage in legislative work and advertise about it12. Many MPs attempt to inform the correspondents 
about their legislative activities, for example through press releases. However, when the issue 
addressed is not on the national agenda, which is most often the case, parliament correspondents 
ignore them13. They also do not cover other MPs’ activities, like constituency service or public relation 
work. Parliament correspondents expect MPs to be in Ankara, involve in legislative work, and act in 
the name of the Nation, not in the name of their constituency. This is in part because parliament 
correspondents are working for national channels, newspapers, and press agencies; among them, no 
local media is represented. In a way, these correspondents – who enjoy a good position in the 
profession, even among political journalists14 - are part of the national elite.  
[14] But parliamentary correspondents produce only part of the media coverage on the MPs. 
Local media do also cover the deputies’ activities, but another kind: they cover them mainly in their 
constituency or when they defend their constituency’s interests. They follow the MPs’ legislative 
activities in the parliament only marginally and indirectly, through the news they get from the Anadolu 
                                                 
11 Interview with the head of Hürriyet Parliament office, Ankara, November 1st, 2004. 
12 These strategies sometimes undermine legislative work. At its beginning in the mid-1990s, Meclis TV began 
broadcasting parliamentary activities. The MPs often try to seat in front of the camera (Kocaoğlu 2003: 45). During the 
committees, which were also broadcast, MPs often tried to speak as long as possible in front of the camera, even if what 
they said had no much relation to the issue dealt with, which considerably slowed down committee work. Therefore, 
Meclis TV stopped broadcasting committee meetings live, but gives only some shortcuts.  
13 Observation, Hürriyet Parliament office, Ankara, November 3rd, 2004. 
14 To become a parliament correspondent, it is necessary to have a press card since more than five years. 
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press agency15. Many backbenchers who are not elected from big cities have more relations with 
local media than with parliament correspondents (like MPs E, G, M)16. Local media, on the other 
hand, view MPs mainly as the representatives of their constituency and defenders of its interest. 
Thus, there is a quite clear division of labour between local and national media concerning the 
coverage of MPs activities, local and national journalists having no direct relation with each other. It 
would be interesting to study further the coverage of MPs' activities by the local and national media. 
Suffice it here to say that local and national media have different role expectations concerning MPs. 
 
Coping with contradictory role expectations 
[15] How do MPs perceive these contradictory expectations? How do they rationalize their 
role-set? As a matter of fact, all the MPs I have interviewed declared that they perceived divergent 
role expectations17. In his memoirs, Kocaoğlu states that expectations from the voters and from his 
party (ANAP) diverged: ‘The voter (…) does not ask you what you have done for the European 
Union. But he wants a weapon permit, he wants a job in the civil service, he wants the appointment 
or the promotion of somebody from his home region, he wants his nephew who failed the exam to 
pass in the next class (…) And you, by force, you get busy with these strange affairs. Because if you 
don’t do that, you’re considered to be a ‘bad MP’’ (Kocaoğlu 2003: 48). ‘In general, the party 
organisation gives excessive importance to personal advantages and spoil demands’ (Kocaoğlu 
2003: 27). Later, this former MP also gives room to his conception (or what he wants to appear as his 
conception) of what a ‘good MP’ is, which is different from the expectations both of the party and the 
voters: ‘I believe I have been a ‘good’ MP according to my own standards. For instance, I haven’t 
become a careerist, I haven’t acquired property in any unlawful manner, I have realised some of my 
ideals, I have given priority not to personal, but to collective demands, I have been a good party 
member’ (Kocaoğlu 2003: 20). 
                                                 
15 Interview with the head of Hürriyet Parliament office, Ankara, November 1st, 2004. 
16 Many deputies publish booklets - at the end of every legislative year, or at the end of the legislature - in which they 
report their legislative activities, and in which they reproduce newspaper cuttings. These booklets aim to produce the 
image of active MPs, involved in parliamentary work and in the defence of their constituency’s interests. Most of the 
newspaper cuttings I could see in these booklets were taken from local newspapers. 
17 No question addressed specifically expectations, but all MPs mentioned the discrepancy between different 
expectations. 
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[16] Like him, all MPs I interviewed stated a discrepancy between their own representation of 
their role and what they perceived was expected from them: ‘We quarrelled a lot between my inner 
voice was telling me and what was expected from me. There were some laws about which I suffered 
much inconvenience (…). Yes, well, the party leader knows what’s right, if it is what Turkey needs, 
then… (…). The ones who come from very professional political backgrounds did not feel any 
discomfort. People like me, in contrast, did’18. Besides this classical tension between the party line 
and individual convictions, all interviewed MPs stressed the contradiction between the voters’ 
expectations and their own role representations: ‘You will help everybody, everywhere. In reality, this 
is not something profitable. In my view, a parliamentarian should be limited to conducting his 
legislative duty. But in Turkey, being a parliamentarian… is perceived as paying attention to all the 
problems of the voters, and that’s what the voters expect from you. If you don’t do that (…) the voters 
erase you, they say it’s wrong’19. Many MPs find this to be an important role conflict: ‘In my view, the 
hire and promotion of civil servants should be administered through a central exam (…) But you will 
invite [the voters] to eat, you will walk around the Parliament with them (…) They enjoy it very 
much… feeling the state. The one who does that, well, does not make any real work, what he does is 
contenting others’20 ‘The problem there [in the constituency] is that the citizens’ understanding of 
politics is: the MP should come to my village, to my city. But it’s not possible (...) ‘You have gone to 
Ankara and you have forgotten us’, but the real duty (…) is here, legislation (…) you experience this 
tension’21.  
[17] It would be wrong to assert that the only normative and legitimate role of an MP is that of 
a legislator or defender of general interest, and that answering the – even personal - demands of 
citizens is not legitimate. Of course, almost all MPs argue that ‘the real duty of an MP is legislation’22, 
and it is often the image that one wants to give to a Western researcher. However, some MPs – like 
MPs A, C, E, G, H, I, L in our sample - do not denounce practices like receiving or answering 
personal demands from citizens, even if they consider them as the result of the state apparatus’ 
dysfunctions. Some of them view these practices as normal, or even as an important part of their 
role: ‘Look, those aren’t bad things. Those are the troubles of the citizens, and… the citizen calls you 
                                                 
18 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
19 Interview, MP A, Ankara, 02/11/2004. 
20 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
21 Interview, MP H, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
22 Interview, MP G, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
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as the protector of his pains. You must be extremely interested and helpful with them. May be they 
aren’t right. But it is necessary to show some interest’23. Providing - even sometimes individual - 
service (hizmet) to the people is broadly considered to be legitimate (Güneş-Ayata 1994: 61). This 
activity is even institutionalizedd in the very functioning of the Assembly. Political groups have printed 
forms called iş takip formu (follow-up form), aiming at rationalizing individual demands, and at dealing 
with them (see Appendix)24. Receiving visits is considered as being part of the MPs’ tasks. According 
to official sources, in the second legislative year of the 22nd legislature (2003-2004), 690,000 visitors 
have come to the Parliament at an average of 3,500 visits a day (Anadolu Ajansı 2004) - 30% less 
than the previous legislative year, mainly because visit hours have been restricted.  
[18] Yet, these different expectations are often perceived as contradictory or even not 
compatible. Truly they are sometimes: ‘The MPs are confronted with a constant traffic of visitors, and 
they can’t spare enough time for legislative activities. The Assembly has taken measures to limit the 
visits on certain days so that the legislative activities are not affected’25. It’s not possible to answer to 
all the expectations: ‘If you want to meet them, you don’t have time left for the Parliament. If you 
don’t, you offend the voters and the citizens’26. In addition to this time allocation problem, the rules of 
the game that yield successful results regarding legislative work differ from those that lead to high 
levels of popularity and public recognition. 
[19] How do individual MPs cope with role strain arising from role conflict? There are two 
possibilities of coping with these diverging role expectations. The first possibility is role-switching, 
meaning that MPs are switching from one role to another according to different contexts. One may 
observe the succession of distinct behaviours and ways of being in their everyday practices. The 
second possibility is role-specialisation, i.e. a kind of ‘division of labour’ between MPs specializing in 
different roles and showing different role orientations. Role orientation refers to systematic 
differences in the legislators’ conceptions of a particular component of the legislator’s role.  
[20] Our hypothesis is that, even if role-switching is present, we can observe a strong internal 
differentiation in role orientation of Turkish MPs, i.e. in their ways of playing the MP’s role-set. As a 
matter of fact, individual role conceptions of the MPs in our sample show strong differences: they 
                                                 
23 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
24 Observation, direction of AKP group, Ankara, 22/04/2005. 
25 Interview, MP G, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
26 Interview, MP A, Ankara, 18/04/2005. 
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prioritize the contradicting role expectations in various ways, some have interiorised the hizmet role 
but others much less: ‘We don’t have enough strength to work at those things, our work here is 
legislation and participating in parliamentary activities (...) I felt very uncomfortable [with the citizens’ 
demands], and I reacted against that (...) In that sense, I was a unlikeable MP, but... They still say, I 
was very respected because I never changed my mind, because I was straight and honest, because I 
pondered on Turkey and the world (…), because I did not expect any rent from politics, because I did 
not pursue any private interests, because I was a man with principles. But I can’t say that I was 
appreciated, or that I devoted myself to the service of the voters. Thus – I suffered much 
inconvenience’27. ‘My characteristic is that I always speak to the citizen, I certainly esteem him (…) 
Even if I can’t do anything for him, at least he will depart satisfied from here’28. Starting from these 
different prioritizations of tasks, I assume that there is considerable scope for different answers to 
these contradictory expectations, at least for some MPs.  
 
Learning process of roles and socialization 
[21] An important factor in this broad interpretation scope is the pretty poor political 
socialization - through which legislative norms and roles are internalised - among Turkish MPs. What 
do the recruitment process and career paths of Turkish MPs indicate in terms of patterns of 
socialization? 
 
Turnover and previous parliamentary experience 
[22] A first important point is the high turnover in the TBMM, which renews itself by more than 
50% in every election since 1980. The highest turnover took place in 1983 because of the coup 
(85%); but it was even higher in 2002 (almost 90%); in the meantime, it varied between 50% and 
60%, which is also quite high. However, more than the mere turnover rate, the previous 
parliamentary experience of Turkish MPs seems important to understand the socialization process. It 
also appears to be quite low, especially in 2002. 
                                                 
27 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
28 Interview, MP I, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
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Table 1: MPs with previous parliamentary experience in proportion to the 
number of seats in the lower chamber of the TBMM (1920- 2002) 
Assembly Date % 
I 1920 23 
II 1923 37 
III 1927 63 
IV 1931 71 
V 1935 66 
VI 1939 68 
VII 1943 67 
VIII 1946 59 
IX 1950 19 
X 1954 49 
XI 1957 47 
XII 1961 16 
XIII 1965 49 
XIV 1969 47 
XV 1973 43 
XVI 1977 53 
XVII 1983 9 
XXI 1999 45 
XXII 2002 19,4 
Sources: Frey (1965: 164); Tachau, Good (1973: 555, table 1); Kalaycıoğlu (1988: 51, table 1); 
Tachau (1988: 108, table 3); TBMM Album. Figures for 1987, 1991 and 1995 could not be calculated. 
 
[23] To the extent that newcomers are inexperienced in legislative politics, their socialization 
into legislative roles and their adoption of the established norms of legislative conduct are likely to be 
quite improbable during a single term or two (Kalaycıoğlu 1988: 49). ‘High turnover rates of seats in 
the TGNA, through their undermining influence on the establishment of binding norms of legislative 
conduct (…), tend to inhibit the professionalisation of deputyship in the TGNA. (…) By 
professionalisation is meant the development of the role of deputyship into a pattern of actions and a 
constellation of expectations that are learned or adopted after a lengthy period of service in a 
legislature, preceded by a period of apprenticeship in a party organization or in the local political 
machinery, which help one to develop the above-mentioned expectations’ (Kalaycıoğlu 1988: 58). 
Although Kalaycıoğlu’s paper deals with the 1983 legislature, which is in many regards an exception 
because of the rupture in political personnel brought by the 1980 coup, his conclusion are probably 
true as well, with some nuance, for most of the post-1983 period, since newcomers in politics have 
been numerous since then. 
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Other socialization processes: party organisations and local elective offices 
[24] However, as Kalaycıoğlu argues, a political career is not limited to parliamentary 
experience. There are other instances of socialization and learning of political roles, the main ones 
being local elective offices and apprenticeship in a party organization. In Germany for example, 
almost all MPs have a long career as party members, mayors, deputies of local councils, and so on 
(Saalfeld 1997). This common socialization and learning process leads to some degree of 
standardization and coherence of MPs’ role. Saalfeld argues that the professionalisation of 
parliamentary roles and the greater importance of career politicians in post-war Germany have 
behavioural implications: as a result of their relatively similar career patterns, German 
parliamentarians have been found to share, at least to some extent, certain ‘professional’ norms. 
What are the previous experience of Turkish MPs in local elective offices and party organizations? 
What do they tell us about MPs’ socialization and learning of political roles? 
[25] For Turkey, we unfortunately have no systematic data. Most studies on this issue have 
been conducted in the 1960s and 1970s, but not pursued until the present day. Moreover, it is 
noteworthy that the main source used to produce this indicator, the albums of the TBMM, does not 
always contain complete data concerning party offices or former local elective offices. Therefore, it is 
probable that due to the nature of the sources, political experience of MPs in local elective offices and 
party organisations is underestimated. Another problem is that the sources do not differentiate 
between previous and present political experience, a very significant difference in terms of political 
careers. Questionnaires help, to some extent, to fill this gap, but are by definition conducted on one 
legislature and do not permit the construction of long statistical series. However, all previous works 
are unanimous in showing poor experience of Turkish MPs, both in local elective offices and in party 
experience. Let us begin with experience in local elective office.  
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Table 2: MPs with previous experience in local elective offices in proportion to 
the number of seats in the lower chamber of the TBMM (1923- 1969) 
Assembly Date Local elective Offices (in %) 
II 1923 - 
III 1927 9 
IV 1931 6 
V 1935 9 
VI 1939 12 
VII 1943 11 
VIII 1946 12 
IX 1950 4 
X 1954 10 
XII 1961 4 
XIII 1965 6 
XIV 1969 9 
Source: Tachau, Good (1973: 555, Table 1). 
 
[26] The more focused analysis conducted by Oya Çitçi, which is based also on the 
Parlamenterler Ansiklopedisi (1983), demonstrates how incomplete the TBMM albums are, which is 
the main source for the above study. 
Table 3: MPs with previous experience in local mandates in proportion to the 
number of seats in the lower chamber of the TBMM (1950-1987) 
Assembly Date Mayor Member of 
municipal 
council 
Member of 
subprovincial 
council 
City 
council 
Total % of MPs 
with 
experience 
in local 
offices 
IX 1950 14 5 8 - 27 5.54 
X 1954 35 8 17 2 62 11.59 
XI 1957 45 12 16 1 74 12.19 
XII 1961 11 3 1 - 15 3.33 
XIII 1965 9 8 5 - 22 4.89 
XIV 1969 17 7 4 - 28 6.22 
XV 1973 16 6 12 - 34 7.56 
XVI 1977 20 7 8 - 35 7.78 
XVII 1983 16 10 6 - 32 7.11 
XVIII 1987 33 9 12 - 54 11.55 
Total  214 75 89 3 383 8.09 
Source: Çitçi (1989: 225) 
[27] The poor local office experience of Turkish MPs becomes clearer when compared with 
other countries. In Germany, the average MPs’ political career begins with a political ‘apprenticeship’ 
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of between two and six years as a local councillor. 31% of the 194 MPs interviewed by Herzog in 
1988/1999 had held local electoral office as councillors prior to their election to the Bundestag, 38% 
had held such a mandate and continued to hold it after their election to the Bundestag, and only 31% 
had never been elected office at local level (Herzog 1990)29. The experience of Turkish MPs in 
elective offices seems to be low compared also to other European countries, where ‘a very large 
proportion of MPs (from 40% upwards) had an elective or governing position at local or regional level 
before entering into the national representative body’ (Cotta, Best 2000: 505). How widespread is the 
experience of MPs in local party offices? It is recognized as a way of learning political roles and 
facilitating parliamentary socialization by the MPs who, in our sample, had this experience, such as 
MP G. However, this experience also appears to be quite rare: 
Table 4: MPs with previous experience in local party offices in proportion to 
the number of seats in the lower chamber of the TBMM (1950-1969) 
Assembly Date Local Party Offices 
(in %) 
II 1923 - 
III 1927 - 
IV 1931 1 
V 1935 2 
VI 1939 4 
VII 1943 4 
VIII 1946 7 
IX 1950 8 
X 1954 7 
XII 1961 - 
XIII 1965 8 
XIV 1969 8 
Source: Tachau, Good (1973: 555, Table 1). 
 
[28] This table clearly shows that until the 1960s political experience in local party offices 
among Turkish MPs is very low, though increasing over time. Tachau and Good conclude that ‘as a 
whole, the data […] suggest that neither local elective offices nor local party offices have been very 
important as channels of recruitment to the national political elite’ (1973:556). But party headquarters 
                                                 
29 These results are similar to those found in earlier studies during the late 1960s. 
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seem more important than local party organizations as a channel of recruitment to the Parliament, as 
Tachau and Good conclude from more precise data concerning the 1960s30: 
Table 5: MPs with previous experience in local and national elective and party 
offices in proportion to the number of seats in the lower chamber of the TBMM 
(1961-1969) 
Year Local 
Elective 
Office (in %) 
Local Party 
Office (in %) 
National Party 
Office (in %) 
1961 4 - 4 
1965 6 8 12 
1969 9 8 17 
Source: Tachau, Good (1973 : 559, Table 3). 
 
[29] Even if national party organizations seem to constitute a more important channel of 
recruitment to the Parliament than local offices, experience there does not seem to be very high 
when compared with other countries. For example, not even 10% of all German MPs hold no party 
function at all, whereas 20% hold positions on the local, 38% on the district, and 20% on the national 
party leadership bodies; on balance, a little less than two-thirds of all German MPs hold positions as 
chairpersons or as members of the executive committees on the different organisational levels of 
their party (Patzelt 1997: 58). Gençkaya (2000) has produced the most precise data on the 
experience of Turkish MPs in local and national party offices, on the basis of a questionnaire 
conducted on the deputies of the 20th Parliament (1995-1999):  
                                                 
30 Another important finding of this study is that the proportion of MPs with former experience in elective and party offices 
strongly varies according to the parties. 
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Table 6: Proportion of MPs interviewed having hold party offices 
Office % of MPs interviewed having hold 
this office 
National congress delegate 31.6 
Provincial congress delegate 27.2 
Member of the national party directing committee  24.6 
Provincial party leader 22 
Subprovincial congress delegate 21.1 
Subprovincial party leader 17.5 
Member of the provincial party executive committee  14.9 
Member of the party assembly 14 
Member of the subprovincial party executive committee 10.5 
Party vice-chairman  8.8 
Office holder in a collateral organisation 7 
Secretary of the provincial party executive committee 6.1 
General secretary or vice general secretary  4.4 
Secretary of the subprovincial party executive committee 3.5 
Member of the central discipline committee  3.5 
Provincial supervisor 2.6 
Deputy chair of a party group 0.9 
Source: Gençkaya (2000: 241, table 6).  
 
[30] In this table including both past and present experiences, one and the same MP can 
have had several party offices (therefore it is difficult to draw comparable data to that of Patzelt). On 
the whole, 23.6% of all MPs Gençkaya interviewed had no party function at all; he states that they 
have on the whole poor experience in party organizations (Gençkaya 2000: 242). Besides, the most 
widespread party office is that of delegate, which is not very binding. 
[31] But this does not indicate precisely the duration of the relation between MPs and parties, 
during which parties can transmit know-how to their members and office holders. In his survey, 
Gençkaya obtained the following results about previous party membership of MPs: 
Table 7: Duration of party membership among interviewed MPs 
Duration of membership 
in the party 
ANAP CHP DSP DYP FP DTP Total 
0-2 years 20% 16.7% - 10.6% 100% 100% 43% 
3-5 years 24% 8.3% 85.7% 35.7% - - 21% 
6-10 years 4% 33.5% 14.3% 17.9% - - 9.7% 
More than 11 years  52% 41.5% - 35.8% - - 26.3% 
Source: Gençkaya (2000: 240, table 5) 
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[32] The group of long-time party members appears to represent only slightly more than one 
quarter of the MPs31. On the other hand, a strong majority of MPs were party members for less than 5 
years, which is congruent with the data given by Kalaycıoğlu on the 1983 Parliament, where about 
one half of the interviewed deputies had never been a member of a socio-political association or of a 
political party, and only about 32% pointed out that they were affiliated with a political party since six 
years or more (Kalaycıoğlu 1988: 59). Although the 1983 Assembly is in many respects an exception, 
political experience of MPs seems not to have improved much since then. Indeed, party boards do 
not designate only candidates well tried and experienced in party organizations; longstanding prior 
party activities are not a condition in candidate selection. Many people are asked by the party 
direction to become candidates without being party members whatsoever.  
[33] Therefore, it would be erroneous to assert that most Turkish MPs’ careers follow typical, 
predictable patterns. In each legislature, there is a relatively high large share of ‘outsiders’ into the 
TBMM, who had not previously pursued a political career. ‘In conclusion, it can be argued that the 
majority of the deputies of the [1983] TBMM were catapulted into their legislative roles without any 
first-hand, prior experience with party politics and without having a lengthy apprenticeship period’ 
(Kalaycıoğlu 1988: 59). There seem to be no strong, institutionalized transmission or learning of MPs’ 
roles during their former experience, neither in party organizations nor in local elective offices. How is 
it inside the Parliament itself? 
 
Transmission inside the Parliament 
[34] A majority of MPs have obtained some professional skills in ‘politics-facilitating 
occupations’ (such as solicitors, civil servants, academics). Some of them had contacts with MPs in 
their former professional life (as was the case of MPs C, F, I in our sample). Besides, they have 
already acquired basic political skills during the initial steps of the political career before election – 
during the campaign, at the latest. Then, the parliamentary organisation itself to some extent moulds 
the roles of MPs seeking re-election and advancement within the hierarchy of party positions. 
However, a parliamentary newcomer will find himself faced with a set of challenges and expectations 
                                                 
31 This is congruent with Kalaycıoğlu’s finding that ‘only a relatively small proportion of about one-quarter or less of the 
deputies may be referred to as professional political actors’ (Kalaycıoğlu 1988: 59). 
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quite unfamiliar to him at first, in terms of political-know-how and roles. How does this learning take 
place inside the TBMM? 
[35] Most of the [1983] deputies were in the process of learning and practising the role of 
being a legislator at the same time (Kalaycıoğlu 1988: 59). This is also the way all MPs interviewed 
for this study felt: all of them reported that professional socialization is happening by practising, that is 
by ‘training on the job’ (Kocaoğlu 2003). Neither the Assembly, nor the parties organize formation 
sessions for new MPs, as all interviewed MPs reported. Some party groups organize short briefings. 
Therefore, the learning of the job and legislative roles in the Assembly occurs in an informal and 
uninstitutionalized way. For example, some new MPs may ask to senior members MPs what are the 
rules of the game or, more importantly, observe the way experienced colleagues exercise their work 
as representatives. Socialization occurs mostly through mimetic practice and distinction.  
[36] Other people, such as the members of the Assembly staff, can play an important role in 
the socialization of new MPs. Turkish MPs have acquired, in recent years, access to more – although 
not extravagant – personnel resources to perform their job. Every MP has one danışman (advisor) 
since the beginning of the 1990s, and one secretary. According to the President of the Assembly, the 
TBMM employed almost 5,000 personnel in 2004 (Anadolu Haber Ajansı 2004)32. Many MPs 
recognize the importance of people knowing how everything works: ‘the people who should help you 
have to know Ankara’s codes well, otherwise they can’t be useful’ (Kocaoğlu 2003: 44). The MPs can 
choose freely their assistant, he can also come from outside. MP L has chosen both an assistant and 
a secretary with parliamentary experience: ‘they know the Assembly well. I believe that you must 
work with people knowing this job professionally. That’s the reason why I chose them’33. ‘My assistant 
made preparations in advance on the issues I was working on. For example I have to make a 
speech, which speeches had been made on this issue before, who had said what (…) he found that, 
and he found very strategic things. (…) I had a good assistant, but everybody could not expect this 
work from his’34. 
                                                 
32 As far as I know, there are no detailed studies on parliamentary staff in Turkey. 
33 Interview, MP L, Ankara, 25/04/2005. 
34 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
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[37] However, parliamentary assistants are not professionals. They have another job: most of 
them are civil servants in other administrations35 and become parliamentary assistants temporarily. 
‘For me to be here is a bit like an escape from the [Education] ministry’36 says one of them. They 
were hired as assistants mainly because they had been sympathizers of a party and have 
acquaintances there (assistant of MP D), or because they knew the MP before through professional 
or personal contacts (assistants of MP A, B, G, F). MPs have chosen them because they thought 
they would be useful for legislative work (E, F), for some technical aspect of it (assistant of MP M) or 
for the relations with the constituency (B). Some assistants do this job to finance their studies in 
econometrics (like the assistant of MP M). The turnover of assistants seems to be quite high, even in 
a single legislature: assistants of MPs A, C, and M changed during the legislature, mainly because 
they found better opportunities elsewhere or because their MP was unsatisfied with them.  
[38] As a consequence, many assistants37 have poor experience of parliamentary work: ‘In 
Turkey, there is no political advisorship (siyasi danışmanlık). In reality, an assistant should prepare 
the documents related to the laws and to the important activities of the MP (...) Here, it’s impossible. 
The people we call advisors (danışman) do any kind of private service, regulate the relations with the 
voters, drive the MP here and there, do everything in short. Well, the real function of parliamentary 
assistant does not exist’38. ‘Here, the assistant’s role (…) is basically to take a bit of the MPs’ burden 
and to help them with public relations. Otherwise, ‘I’ll prepare a law proposal, find me the relevant 
documents, prepare a report and then I’ll look at that…’ There’s nothing like that here’39. Many of the 
MPs I interviewed complaint about the assistants: ‘Honestly, this mechanism doesn’t work in a very 
effective way. The so-called advisors (danışman) are generally young people (…). In order to be an 
advisor, he must have more knowledge than you. But in practice this is not the case, I call them 
helpers (yardımcı), it’s righter’40. Some, like MP C, also complaint about the research service of the 
Assembly as being inefficient and useless. When he needed documentation or expertise on an issue, 
                                                 
35 The wage given to an assistant from the outside is low (about 1,200 YTL in 2005), whereas civil servants keep their 
wage in addition to a supplement; this can explain why civil servants are often preferred as assistants (Kocaoğlu 2003: 
44). 
36 Interview, assistant of MP D, Ankara, 02/11/2004. 
37 The Turkish word for parliamentary assistant is danışman, which in other contexts means ‘advisor’. 
38 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
39 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 15/04/2005. 
40 Interview, MP H, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
Citation: Massicard, Elise (2005) ‘Differences in role orientation among Turkish MPs', European Journal of Turkish 
Studies, Thematic Issue N°3, Being a MP in contemporary Turkey, URL : http://www.ejts.org/document499.html  
To quote a passage, use paragraph (§). 
he preferred calling specialists working outside of the Assembly he knew before41. Because he was 
dissatisfied with his assistant and could not find anybody convenient in Ankara, MP J hired an 
assistant he knew before from his constituency, Istanbul, and pays a surplus wage from his own 
pocket. Some assistants however, after being hired on a temporary base, manage to build 
specialized knowledge, be recommended and stay in the Parliament serving other MPs, which is the 
case of the assistant of MP E, who had fifteen years experience in the Assembly before.  
[39] It is also the case of some secretaries. Some of them are professional, like MP C’s: ‘My 
secretary really made my life easier. Because there’s a special ritual of the Assembly, a special 
jargon. And she knew them’42. However, others are not: ‘Actually, I didn’t want to work here. I wanted 
to make an academic career. But this is in the long term. My husband wanted me to work before, 
that’s why I took the exam. This is a general exam for civil service. Afterwards, every institution opens 
its own exam’43. At the same time, she continues studying French language and literature at the 
master level. Even after having passed the exam, some secretaries don’t have a permanent status, 
and are brought from other administrations temporarily. In this case, they mostly enter the job through 
personal relations and recommendations. When the legislature changes, their staying in the 
Assembly depends on the recommendation of the MP with whom they have been working, whereas 
for permanent secretaries, the electoral new deal changes only with whom they will work. As access 
to assistants and secretaries with parliamentary experience and good reputation is a matter of 
recommendation (Kocaoğlu 2003: 44), MPs having previous connections in the parliament are 
privileged for finding them, which implies a kind of reproduction effect. For instance, MP L knew from 
his previous MP mandate an assistant and a secretary with parliamentary experience he chose 
during his second mandate. 
[40] These are only clues, which should be studied further in order to build more precise 
knowledge. However, our hypothesis is that an important part of the parliamentary staff44 is not 
specialised and does not contribute heavily to socialization into parliamentary roles. The employment 
of specialised staff is an indirect indicator commonly used to measure the tendency of parliamentary 
                                                 
41 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
42 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
43 Interview, secretary of MP M, Ankara, 22/04/2005. 
44 This is probably different for committee secretaries, who are older and have much more experience in the Parliament 
than most MPs’ secretaries. In the same way, there are party group advisors who have political experience and are able 
to help MPs in writing speeches. Interview, MP A, Ankara, 18/04/2005. 
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politics to be pursued as a professional career. Other indirect measures include the average age at 
which MPs are first elected to Parliament, the average number of years they spend as MPs - the 
longer they remain members, the less likely they are to have a significant pre- or post-parliamentary 
career outside politics. Another important indicator is the degree to which politics becomes their 
predominant professional occupation (Saalfeld 1997: 38). Is MP a full-time job, like in Germany, 
where it leaves little time to spare for a non-parliamentary career? Or can it also be a ‘retirement job’ 
for accomplished trade-union officials or local dignitaries? It is hard to know how many MPs retain a 
non-political professional activity, but surely some activities cannot be practised during the 
mandate45.  
[41] These sketchy clues tend to show that it is difficult to argue that the job of a deputy is 
highly professionalised (for 1983, see Kalaycıoğlu 1988: 60). During the interviews, I sometimes had 
the impression that some MPs were not very well informed about what was going on in the 
Parliament, did not know very well the procedures nor the appropriate ways of behaviour (especially 
MP E). The professionalisation of parliamentary roles is frequently believed to cause significant 
changes in parliamentarians’ behaviour.  
[42] Many MPs don’t consider themselves to be professionals: ‘If you want the truth, I still 
haven’t discovered the subtleties of parliamentarianism’46; ‘I used ‘politician’ in the sense of an 
occupation, a profession, i.e. somebody who spends all his time, energy, investment, strength, and 
money in politics, and who therefore wants to stay in politics at any prize, to be re-elected as an MP. I 
have never been like that’47. In this perspective, the subtitle of Kocaoğlu’s book (2003), ‘Ankara 
souvenirs of an inexperienced MP’, is interesting. All these also show the pejorative connotation of 
professional politics.  
[43] Therefore, there seem to be no strong standardization of role learning, neither through 
the main ways of transmission of political roles (party and elected offices) nor through the 
professionalisation of legislative activity. Thus, the learning and socialization process varies from an 
individual to another. It strongly depends on each MP’s social characteristics, trajectories, and 
conditions of access to the parliament, according to whether they have been active in a party, an 
                                                 
45 Such as civil service. Since 2001, solicitors also have to interrupt practising to enter the Assembly. 
46 Interview, MP F, Ankara, 22/04/2005. 
47 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 15/04/2005. 
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associative or trade-union work, or whether their election is due to support outside the political field. 
Hence, it is even more important to take in account extra-parliamentary experiences that predispose 
MPs to assume the prescribed roles and shape the ways they do.  
 
II. Main resources shaping role orientation 
[44] MPs differ strongly in the ways they allocate their time and energy to different 
components of parliamentary work. Some focus on committee work, others on the plenary, some 
devote much time to prepare thoroughly legislative activities, other do first and foremost casework. 
There are probably equally large variations in extra-parliamentary activities: national and sub-national 
party work, pressure group contacts, attending of constituency local life, and media coverage. A large 
amount of the variation in behaviour of individual MPs cannot be simply accounted for by party, and 
must be due to other factors, like individual resources and role orientations. What shapes MPs’ role 
orientation? 
[45] The only work addressing the question of role differences in Turkey is that of Kalaycıoğlu 
(1995). He identifies four ‘representational styles’, mainly according to types of clientelism patterns 
and interests that MPs represent: the ‘landlords’, the ‘gentlemen of the periphery’ (these two groups 
representing about three fourths of the MPs), the ‘lobbyists’ and the ‘diplomats’. The main factor he 
selects to explain these differences is the type of constituency represented (‘rural constituencies’, 
‘small cities’, ‘Ankara & Izmir’, and ‘Istanbul’). In a way, he follows American political scientists, who 
have concentrated primarily on the repertoire of representative roles (Wahlke et al. 1962). However, 
this approach neglects other dimensions of MPs’ role-set. I would like to take their role orientation as 
a whole. However, including many dimensions makes it difficult to construct a typology of coherent 
roles without conducting further systematic research. 
[46] When looking at other factors, it seems important to turn to the individual level. My basic 
assumption is that MPs’ role orientation strongly depends on resources at their disposal. In this 
perspective, I shall try to present the main resources shaping MPs’ role orientation, and the way they 
do. In my view, three main factors strongly influence the MPs’ role orientation: their position within the 
party, their extra-parliamentary (mainly professional) skills, and their relation with their constituency.  
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[47] However, it would be misleading to assume an automatic, causal relationship between 
initial resources and role orientation. Rather, some resources are given added-value, entertained, 
reinforced, transformed – for example non-parliamentary resources into political ones – while others 
are neglected, depending on institutional contexts, perceived opportunities, and individual strategies 
(Lacam 1988). This process-wise approach implies that the diachronic dimensions and the changes 
in the course of the legislature have to be taken into account.  
 
Relation to the party 
[48] The MPs’ role orientation strongly depends, first of all, on whether their party is in 
government or in the opposition. In many ways, the role of individual MPs changes dramatically with 
shifts of governments or party changes, since institutional constraints on them are very different. 
Differences in role behaviour between majority and opposition MPs have been demonstrated in 
various studies on other countries, and seem to be relevant for Turkey too (Aslan-Akman 2005). For 
example, plenary questions are asked almost exclusively by opposition members, in Turkey like in 
many other countries, as is obvious in our sample. The committee work of opposition members is 
more demanding, since the government prepares most draft bills, therefore there is no much work left 
for majority MPs. On the contrary, attendance to the plenary sessions is, on the whole, higher among 
majority MPs than among opposition MPs, since the vote of the former is necessary to pass the 
laws48. Therefore, party membership is the first factor shaping MPs’ role orientation. However, 
relation to the party also shapes to a large extent one’s parliamentary positions. 
 
Positions within the parliamentary institutions 
[49] The main factor of distinction between role orientations within the Assembly is the 
internal division of labour, especially between ‘leaders’ and ‘backbenchers’, i.e. those who hold some 
formal position of leadership and those who hold none. Here I refer to the distinction introduced by 
Searing (1994) between ‘position roles’ and ‘preference roles’. Position roles are ‘closely tied to, and 
highly defined by, prominent positions in the institutional structure’ and are practically forced upon the 
incumbents of positions that are very demanding. Having or not a position is important in terms of 
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legislative activities: for example, backbenchers are more active in introducing questions than the 
parliamentary group leadership. But what interests me here is that the positions within the Assembly 
are the most crucial casting moulds of legislative roles, since fellow MPs attach quite specific role 
expectations to them. This is especially true for leadership positions such as chairman or 
spokesperson of a committee or a parliamentary group. AN MP has to live up to those expectations 
attached to his position if he intends to be promoted within the hierarchy of his parliamentary group 
(Patzelt 1997:57). On the contrary, preference roles ‘are less defined, and allow more scope for 
individual preferences to shape role interpretations’. Backbenchers have the opportunity to shape 
their role orientation to a larger extent than ministers or committee chairs, whose role is quite 
determined.  
[50] This distinction is even inscribed spatially in the buildings of the parliament. Most MPs 
have their office (makam) in the Public Relations Building (halkla ilişkiler binası), which was opened 
for service in 198449. However, the main position role holders do not: some of them work mostly 
outside the Parliament - ministers in their ministries, members of party boards in the party building, 
etc. In the TBMM itself, a special space is reserved for the position role holders: the offices of the 
members of the Bureau of the Assembly, of the parliamentary group boards, and committee directors 
are located in the ‘main building’ (anabina), which is also the place where the General Assembly Hall 
is located, where the plenary sessions, committee and parliamentary group meetings take place, and 
where the media have their offices. This building, which is older than the Public Relations Building - it 
was opened for service in 1961 - is also much more difficult to access for visitors. It also seems that 
this building has another rhythm since, as I could observe it, there are very precise clocks 
everywhere, which is not the case in the Assembly’s other buildings. Its very name (anabina) reflects 
a strong hierarchy of activities. Thus, there is a kind of spatial specialization between legislative 
activities and reception of visitors.  
[51] Now, how many MPs hold position roles? The Bureau of the Assembly is composed of 
fifteen members (one President, four Deputy Presidents, seven Secretary Members and three 
Administrative Members), all elected from among the MPs. Each of the seventeenth specialised 
permanent committees established to scrutinize bills and control government activities have officers - 
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such as a chairman, vice-chairman, spokesperson, and secretary50, totalising about 70 positions51. 
However, in mid-term the committee members and positions are redistributed. Therefore, in one 
single legislature, more than 70 people can hold these positions. Unfortunately, no precise data about 
the level of stability of these positions is available. The commission directors we interviewed (MPs I, 
K) remained stable throughout the legislature. On the other hand, MP E was only a committee 
member in the first half of the legislature, and was elected as the vice-chairman of another committee 
in the second half.  
[52] Finally, the political parties’ hierarchical structures also create positions: most members 
of the party boards are MPs as well52. But the parliamentary groups also produce specific positions: 
the chairman of parliamentary group (grup başkanı) is at the same time the leader of the party, 
therefore it is not really a parliamentary position; his assistants are the deputy chairs (grup 
başkanvekilleri). Most parties have limited their number to three, however other parties have more 
(for example, AKP has five); the parliamentary groups’ executive committee (grup yönetim kurulu), 
which comprises nine to eleven members (however, the AKP has up to 15), the group supervisors 
(grup denetçileri) which are two per party group; finally, the group discipline council (grup disiplin 
kurulu), which is composed by three to seven people per parliamentary group (Bakırcı 2000: 298-
307). This amounts to 17 to 23 positions per party group, the AKP having 27 at the end of 2005. 
[53] Therefore, the number of parliamentary positions can be put at an estimated 85 plus 
about 20 per party group, that is from 125 to 185 positions, i.e. from 22% to 33% of the total amount 
of parliamentary seats, depending on the number of parties with a parliamentary group. We have to 
consider also the minister offices, which can, but must not, be given to MPs. However, one single MP 
may hold several positions at the same time, although there are some restrictions: ministers, 
members of the central executive committee (merkez yönetim kurulu) of a party, and deputy chairs 
can not seat in permanent committees. It would be interesting to analyse further the people holding 
                                                 
50 In addition, the examination of accounts committee has a supervisor. 
51 There are also other kind of committees, like international friendship and control committees, but they are more or less 
voluntary, and not very binding in terms of role. 
52 Party leaders, the Prime Minister and most ministers are MPs. In fact, Turkish political parties are mostly headed by 
parliamentarians, and usually the role of a party leader cannot be separated from that of an MP, even if it is not true the 
other way round. In 2005, among the 81 members of the CHP board, 52 were MPs, i.e. about 64%. However, those 
members of the leadership who were not MPs were exclusively members of the party assembly; all higher position 
holders were MPs. This relation is even clearer at the AKP, where 82% of the members of the central directing committee 
are MPs, and all other party leaders are also MPs (figures for the party direction elected in October 2003). 
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one or several parliamentary positions, their particular profile, and their chance for re-election. Suffice 
it to say here that the proportion of MPs with positions seems lower than in many countries, for 
example Germany, where 15% of MPs are committee chairpersons – 12.7% in the TBMM -, 28% are 
members of a parliamentary group’s executive committee - about 12% in the 22nd Turkish 
Parliament, after ANAP has become a parliamentary group-, and 6% are members of the presidium 
of the parliament – only 2.7% for the TBMM (Patzelt 1997: 57). The position of backbencher without 
any special parliamentary position seems to be found in the Turkish Parliament more often than in 
Germany. 
[54] These positions mould MPs’ role constraints. Whereas members of the group 
leaderships are most active in the plenary, members of important committees are very active in 
committees: members of committee boards all told me that the plenary sessions were not their 
priority. For example, MP K, leader of an important committee, declared ‘I don’t participate too much 
in the plenary when I don’t have a special job to do there’53. However, not all of these positions are 
equally binding in terms of role-orientation. Their binding character differs in part with formal levels of 
political leadership, which for a committee office would vary both with the importance ascribed to the 
committee and with that accorded to the committee leadership position (Frey 1965:242). The 
committee rankings given by Frey (1965:241-242, 445-447) with the attribution method cannot be 
extended automatically for the post-1980 period. However, according to all my interlocutors, the 
paramount committee is the Plan and budget committee, which has a central role in the legislative 
process since every law having a financial aspect – i.e. nearly every law - goes through it before 
being discussed in the plenary. Therefore, being a mere member of the plan and budget committee 
may be more binding in terms of role orientation than being the secretary or even the vice-
chairperson of the examination of accounts committee. The binding character of committee 
membership differs in part according to how time-demanding it is. Some committees gather very 
often, others do not. Again, the plan and budget committee is very time-demanding, while the petition 
committee seems to have quite light an agenda. Therefore, both leadership positions and committees 
an MP is member of are important to understand his role constraints. As MP K, chairman of an 
important committee, puts it: ‘For me, it is now a kind of senior period (abilik dönemi). Everybody ask 
                                                 
53 Interview, MP K, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
Citation: Massicard, Elise (2005) ‘Differences in role orientation among Turkish MPs', European Journal of Turkish 
Studies, Thematic Issue N°3, Being a MP in contemporary Turkey, URL : http://www.ejts.org/document499.html  
To quote a passage, use paragraph (§). 
what I think. And when people behave like that, you too, like it or not, you get into this position, it’s not 
possible any more to stand up, go to the pulpit and make a speech causing to stand up’54.  
[55] How are these positions distributed? The main instances dividing positions are the 
parliamentary groups55. After entering the TBMM, MPs may express three wishes about committee 
membership. Then, the parliamentary groups distribute them according to how many seats each they 
have in each committee (on the basis of the relative strength of the parties in the General Assembly). 
If they wish, some MPs can get several committee assignments: MP C was a member of three 
permanent committees at the same time, and even took leadership positions in two of them. The 
groups need to have members on all committees, and not only on those that are attractive to most 
MPs. Therefore, they sometimes send MPs to committees where they do not wish to seat (which was 
the case of MPs B, E for the first mid-term). Formally, it is the group assembly as a whole that 
decides on committee placements, but the group leadership has crucial functions in this respect, and 
makes use of that power to distribute reward and punishment. Group leaderships probably assign to 
the most important and/or attractive committees the MPs they trust the most and they think will do 
good work. In this respect, the trajectories of both MPs in our sample who had previous parliamentary 
experience (K and L) show ascension in terms of the importance of the committee they were 
members. In contrast, MP B and some other MPs had taken an oppositional stance against his party. 
He answered to my question about the results: ‘the most of us were expelled from the committees’56. 
In the second mid-term, he was not given any permanent committee membership – since some MPs 
may have none. On the other hand, after having worked during the first two legislative years in an 
expert group for the party headquarters, MP L was affected in the second mid-term to the Plan and 
Budget Committee. The redistribution of committee memberships at mid-term is a kind of 
readjustment linked to the groups’ appreciation of MPs’ performance.  
[56] As for the committee leadership positions, the party group leaderships agree with each 
other over their distribution per party (Bakırcı 2000: 304). Then, the committee boards are elected by 
the committee members. However, especially for important committees and for chair positions, the 
party leaderships have a decisive, though informal, role. MP K, who has a long experience in the 
                                                 
54 Interview, MP K, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
55 MPs without a party group (independent MPs or MPs whose party has less than 20 representatives) have no committee 
membership. 
56 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 15/04/2005. 
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TBMM, admitted that ‘in general, the committee chairpersons are determined by the party board and 
the party leader’. When I asked him how himself became the committee chairman, he answered: ‘I 
didn’t want to, the Prime Minister wanted me to’57. For less important committees and minor positions 
like secretaries, the groups’ pressure may be less important: MP E was elected vice-chairman in a 
not very important committee during the second term, even if he was not very close to his party 
leadership. 
[57] Therefore, the main institution distributing parliamentary positions are parliamentary 
groups, themselves being very closely tied to parties. They also organize labour division while 
assigning responsibilities more restricted in time. The groups decide about which MPs speak in the 
name of the party on the floor. The deputies also have to take the consent of the group leadership for 
most of their legislative initiatives, such as the submission of law proposals, motions for questions, or 
the making of a speech in the plenary sessions, even in their own name58, and even to make a 
speech in the party meetings59. Those who violate these rules can be subjected to various sanctions 
and punishments. 
[58] Through these processes, groups have a strong control on legislative behaviour but also, 
to some extent, are the gatekeepers to role orientation. ‘In general, the party gives some duties, they 
say: ‘prepare yourself for this law proposal’’60. MP A, who was very close to the party leadership at 
times, made several speeches on the floor in the name of the party on important subjects (budget), 
which were related to his area of expertise, although he was not a ‘group spokesperson’. MPs are far 
from being passive in this process, they can try to get some duties, by showing their will to engage: 
‘They gave me [these duties] also because I wanted to do some work’61. Parliamentary groups can 
also to a certain extent orientate given MPs on specific issues: for example, MP C was asked by his 
party group to cover a quite technical issue he was not familiar with. However, the party also 
                                                 
57 Interview, MP K, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
58 In every session, three MPs can make a speech out of the agenda; in the 22nd Assembly, two of them are generally 
from the AKP, and one of them of CHP. 
59 In each weekly party meeting, only three speeches are accepted. The party leadership may also decide that nobody 
should speak. To get the authorization to give a speech in the group meeting, it is often necessary to give the text of the 
speech in advance to the group leadership. 
60 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 15/04/2005. 
61 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
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entrusted him with this duty because he was preparing thoroughly his speeches and was politically 
reliable: ‘I also made some speeches to defend the party against attacks’62.  
[59] Some MPs feel marginalized by these procedures, for two main reasons: first, because 
they are not given any responsibility by the group leadership: ‘because I was an opponent, they did 
not make me speak (…) It never happened that I went to a conference or I appeared on television as 
a spokesperson entrusted by the party’63. In the same way, MP E has never been given any plenary 
discourse in the name of his first party: ‘It happens that I participate often to the plenary sessions, but 
I was not given any duty to do (...) the party does not really test you, and because it doesn’t ask you 
on which issues you have knowledge, what you could be able to do, in which activities you could 
participate nor what kind of thoughts you could produce on which laws, the deputy chairs choose 
their own guys (...). There is a core staff which they like and this staff speaks all the time’64. The 
second reason why some MPs feel marginalized is because the party can block their initiatives. ‘I had 
prepared a law proposal. The party leader and the deputy chairs came, saying ‘it’s impossible, how 
can you engage in such an initiative without asking us?’ (…) Unfortunately, they hindered me’65. 
Some MPs would just not take the risk of being blocked – may be because they know better the 
implicit limits - and would take advice from the party leadership before submitting any initiative. 
[60] Which kind of MPs do party leaderships marginalize? They would not give 
responsibilities to their opponents, those MPs who often don’t vote according the party line, and to 
those whom they are not very confident about. Parties would also not give responsibilities to MPs 
who are not very close to the party board and have no special skill. By having no legislative 
responsibility, those MPs enjoy more scope to shape their own role-orientation, but do not have much 
access to party resources. However, parliamentary groups do not have interest to marginalize or to 
hinder too much the deputies they don’t control, because then there is the risk for party change – 
actually, MP E resigned from his party. Rather, they may try to neutralize or ride along with the MPs 
they are not confident about (Kalaycıoğlu 1995: 54).  
[61] By having no responsibility, backbenchers have difficulties to access the national media, 
which is believed to be important for their public image. Activities having no legislative effect but 
                                                 
62 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
63 Interview, MP B, 03/11/2004 and 15/04/2005. 
64 Interview, MP E, Ankara, 24/04/2005. 
65 Interview, MP E, Ankara, 24/04/2005. 
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which are broadcasted on Meclis TV or elsewhere - like submitting law proposals, asking oral 
questions, and delivering speeches on the floor in their own name - are ways of demonstrating 
publicly their legislative activity, which are hardly hindered by parties. Most of them try to publicize 
these activities even more by communicating them to national media. Some, like MP E, complaint 
that they are not given sufficient attention. Positions holders, like MP I, the chairman of an important 
committee, have another relationship to media and to these legislative tools: ‘It is necessary that our 
other colleagues (…) take the floor from time to time and send a message to the voters telling them ‘I 
am here, too’. In order to give them occasions to do that, it is necessary that we don’t take the floor 
too often. Because I appear very often on TV programs, I am in the press every day anyway’66. ‘I 
have never made a speech out of the agenda, because I don’t believe that to be very effective. 
Making a speech out of the agenda is like telling the voters through the TV ‘look, I’m here’. I didn’t 
need that, because I am a very busy and appreciated MP (…), my name is well known, anyway (…) I 
have enough publicity’67. 
 
Relation to the party 
[62] The parties control resources that are essential for a politician’s career, like the 
distribution of power positions and responsibilities in the parliament and in public institutions, and 
electoral nomination (Nay 2003: 547). In many cases, the position on the party list contributes more 
to a candidate’s election than his popularity or link with a particular segment of the electorate 
(Hazama 2005: §17, 18). Except for very few parties, and in few constituencies68, it is the party 
leadership that selects and ranks the candidates on the ticket, even if local organisations can 
influence informally the ranking in few cases. Proximity to the party leadership also means more 
facilities in terms of access to resources, and, in some cases, more demands and more possibilities 
to build social support: ‘because I’m a founding member of the party and people think I have weight in 
the party, the citizens sometimes come to me saying ‘they told me that if you are the intermediary it 
should work better’’69. As a whole, MPs are highly dependent on their parties for re-selection as 
                                                 
66 Interview, MP I, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
67 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 27/04/05. 
68 In the 2002 legislative elections, only the DYP organized primaries in 28 provinces, and the CHP in 11 provinces, all the 
other candidates where designated by the party headquarters (Massicard 2003: 9). 
69 Interview, MP I, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
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parliamentary candidates, re-election, access to resources, and career advancement. Therefore 
parties, serving as the major gatekeepers in a political career, do have strong pressure tools on MPs.  
[63] Nevertheless, MPs do not approach party institutions in the same way, since they have 
different positions in their parties and differing representations about what kind of party backing they 
need. The few MPs who do not expect to be re-nominated in the coming elections do not feel strong 
group pressure. But many MPs feel highly dependent on their party’s backing. Most MPs who were 
asked by the party board to become candidates without strong local backing and without being party 
members whatsoever also feel strongly dependent on the party if they want to be re-elected. These 
would vote according to the party line, try to demonstrate their loyalty to the leader, to be over-
zealous by showing intense activity in the service of party interests, and to get responsibilities; more 
generally, they would try to act according to what they think the party expects from them. Such are for 
example MPs who have been nominated due to their links with the national organisation. They feel 
they need the backing of the party to secure a nomination on a party list in the next elections. It is the 
case of MP D, who lived for more than 30 years abroad and returned to Turkey for the 2002 
elections. Even if he had important positions in the country where he had settled, he has no local 
backing at all and few acquaintances in Turkey: ‘I apply party discipline. I won’t express any other 
idea. Well, if there is a very important issue, I speak with the party leader in the group meeting, I tell 
him what I want to say, I discuss with them which opinion I should give, I ask their advice… In every 
issue I try to reflect the party’s opinion’70. He describes his own position in the party as follows: ‘I gain 
more and more importance’. Since October 2003, he is a member of the CHP party assembly. In the 
same manner, MP J – who was the last elected on the list in his constituency- has stuck to the party 
line and taken the responsibility of the leadership of a subcommittee. He also managed to be 
entrusted to speak in the plenary in the party’s name, and finally was nominated as a minister.  
[64] Extra-party resources - especially social support - which some MPs enjoy make them 
somehow less dependent on their party’s backing, or give them better arguments to be put on the list. 
Even if they think they are less dependent on the party, most of these MPs would try not to alienate 
the leader. Some, though remaining loyal, would pay ‘minimal service’ to the party. Some MPs do not 
regularly attend the plenary sessions, come in and out of the plenary sessions while hanging out in 
the corridors, and enter the meetings only at the moment of the voting, to vote according to their 
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group’s line. Aslan-Akman suggests that these MPs are usually the ones who are not very familiar 
with the legislative process, those MPs who devote more time and energy to constituency work 
(Aslan-Akman 2005: 44).  
[65] MP E – the last elected on the list - seems to have tried, at the beginning of the 
legislature, to get a higher place into the party and to build good relations with the leadership. The 
party leader was the witness of his wedding, which took place during his mandate. However, he 
voted against the party line when he disagreed on some issues related to his constituency, and was 
impeded by the party from doing some proposals and discourses. He joined the internal opposition 
during a party congress, and discipline proceedings were being taken against him when he finally 
resigned from his party. This MP, who had no special parliamentary or party responsibility but was 
elected mainly because of strong personal backing, followed opinions expressed by his constituents 
when they diverged from the party line, privileging social support over his party backing. Afterwards, 
he joined another party that he may have considered had better chances to enter parliament in the 
next elections than his previous party. 
 
Professional resources 
[66] Non-political, especially professional, resources influence MPs’ role orientation. Political 
parties play an active role in the selection of political personnel. Party boards know that they need 
MPs with different types of competence. They need for example some MPs able to serve on 
parliamentary committees in the European legislative bodies in which Turkey is represented 
(Kalaycıoğlu 1995: 54). Parties also nominate candidates who are specialists of some issues, 
because they plan to take benefit from their expertise. The main non-political or professional skills 
that seem important in the shaping of MPs’ role orientation are: technical knowledge (especially 
juridical), oratory skills, relational resources, and fame71.  
[67] Many of the MPs without political experience, and who are invited by the parties to run 
as candidates, are people having professional resources, which can be reinvested in parliamentary 
                                                 
71 We have to distinguish parliamentary skills from political skills. Whereas oratory skills may be enacted in parliamentary 
but also other political activities (campaigning), juridical knowledge is best employed in the legislative process and may 
not have many other uses in the political field. 
Citation: Massicard, Elise (2005) ‘Differences in role orientation among Turkish MPs', European Journal of Turkish 
Studies, Thematic Issue N°3, Being a MP in contemporary Turkey, URL : http://www.ejts.org/document499.html  
To quote a passage, use paragraph (§). 
work. This is the case of MPs B, F72 and H in our sample: they came from the academy, law, and 
bureaucracy. This kind of MPs does not necessarily need strong grassroots support. This is turn 
affects his role orientation. However, parties prefer professional skills only if they are used in their 
interest and do not always permit much independence from party organisations. Some of these MPs 
(F, H) – probably those who want to stay in politics - are loyal to their party, act mainly as technicians, 
accepting or even legitimising party control and party discipline. Others (MP B) behave in a more 
independent way, since they have alternative career prospects.  
[68] As a matter of fact, people having important professional skills also have a previous 
career on which their entry into politics depends. MP F was retired when he became MP; MP B had 
been asked to run in the 1995 elections, but he refused as he had other career prospects; in 1999, 
since his career prospects had vanished, he accepted. Only two MPs in our sample (B and E) 
retained an extra-parliamentary occupation during their mandate, with interests related to it. But even 
previous professional experiences shape MPs’ worldview, values, and interests. For example, those 
who have been active in NGOs are more likely to be policy-oriented, as is obvious in MP C’s use of 
legislative tools: ‘There are speeches in the party’s name and speeches in one’s own name. 
Speeches in one’s own name have no effect. It’s only to say ‘I have spoken, too’. Speeches in the 
party’s name have effect. I gave speeches in the party’s name only’73. Of course, this is also because 
MP C did not need grassroots support and was close to the party board. Finally, professional 
experience shapes their future prospects. Their professional career often permits them to project their 
future somewhere else than in politics, and makes them less dependent on parties: ‘I never said ‘I 
absolutely want to be an MP again, at any prize’’74. All previous MPs interviewed for this study (A, B, 
and C) returned to their occupation after their mandate. Civil servants and professionals can turn 
back to their job quite easily.  
 
Technical know-how 
[69] The first important skill that can be turned into a parliamentary resource is technical 
knowledge. Each group has specific MPs competent on specific issues, who often take the floor on 
                                                 
72 MP F became a member of CHP in 1999, because he was asked by the party direction to run as a candidate for the 
legislative election, which was again the case in 2002. 
73 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
74 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
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behalf of their party group ‘[The party group] gave me the floor on issues I was familiar with (…) 
Because I was an expert on this issue, it was necessary that I made the speech’75. ‘In general, I 
speak very rarely on the floor. But in some periods and on certain issues requiring proficiency, I 
speak as an arbitrator’76. The committees are another place where technical know-how can be easily 
valorised. Since work occurs in small groups, knowing the issues here is much more important than 
on the floor where voting is often sufficient. MPs tend to get committee assignments corresponding to 
the policy area with which they are familiar, thanks to their previous education or experience. Most 
frequently, MPs explained the reasons of their committee membership by their skills in the policy area 
in question, and sometimes by a general interest. 
[70] MP H is a case in point. Before being elected, he had worked during more than twenty 
years as an attorney, specializing in public and administrative law. He became a member of CHP 
only a few months before the elections. His juridical know-how can be especially useful for control 
activities, since he is in the opposition. During the interview, he stressed the continuity between his 
former profession and his activity as an MP: ‘I had an advantage from a professional point of view (...) 
You know the mechanism from before, anyway’. He concentrates on things he can influence upon as 
a jurist, i.e. not on political issues, but on irregular proceedings (like corruption or spoils) and 
parliamentary immunity. He has rapidly focused on written questions, which he finds more effective in 
terms of results than oral questions, law proposals or investigations. During the first three years of the 
legislature, he has asked almost 300 written questions. He is the only MP to have answered to my 
question about time allocation that he spends much time in his office, preparing the files and following 
up the cases. His skills can also be employed in committee work. At the beginning of the legislature, 
he had wished – and has obtained – a juridical committee. He attends every single committee 
meeting, and is very active there, too77.  
[71] Another skill that is often reinvested in parliamentary work is knowledge of bureaucracy. 
Many former bureaucrats become MPs. MP F was a high civil servant specialized in public finance. 
He also stresses how useful his previous professional skills are for his MP activity: ‘I often came to 
the Assembly as a bureaucrat (…) with the ministers, when laws were changed (...). It proved to be 
useful, the fact that I knew on what level the discussions take place and how made it easier for me as 
                                                 
75 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
76 Interview, MP I, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
77 Interview, MP H, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
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a new politician’. This knowledge was probably decisive in his assignment to the plan and budget 
committee: ‘As a person knowing how the governmental machine works, I expressed the wish to be 
assigned to the Plan and Budget Committee. (…) Of course, this work gives you some knowledge, 
and I thought that the place where this knowledge can be efficiently used is the Plan and Budget 
Committee. Because in the plenary, when you know about something, you can’t speak. In the 
plenary, other MPs speak more often, but there is a technical dimension in my work. I consider 
myself, more than as a politician, as a technician (…) In the plenary, when I am appointed as a 
member of the Plan and Budget Committee, I get the chance of transferring my knowledge from 
there’78. He is sometimes mandated to speak in the name of his party on the issues he is specialized 
in, but does not engage much in discourses in his own name. He is also very active in written 
questions, since he has asked about 170 during the three legislative years.  
 
Oratory skills 
[72] Both the floor and the committees are places where the individual MPs’ oratory skills can 
be demonstrated and reinvested. The ability to make impressive discourses makes an MP more likely 
to be chosen as a spokesperson: ‘Sometimes, the group deputy chairs want certain persons to speak 
on certain articles of law (…) because they believe their speech will be more influential, more 
striking’79. By reinvesting and enhancing this skill, some MPs can achieve to be entrusted more 
duties: ‘I took the speeches in the Assembly very seriously (…). On important issues, they generally 
sent me in the party’s name (…) Because I was always well prepared when I took the floor, I was 
considered to be a good speaker in the Assembly. Then, [the party group] entrusted me also with 
issues I was not familiar with’80. These skills also make their holders more confident to take the floor. 
Most of the MPs interviewed who considered they had these skills were academics, lawyers and 
militants (MPs B, C, G, I). Available evidence suggests that the most frequent and ardent speakers in 
the CHP group have law or academic backgrounds (Aslan-Akman 2005: §35). This skills shape role-
orientation, since they provide for those MPs more visibility, make public figures out of them, and give 
them access to media.  
                                                 
78 Interview, MP F, Ankara, 22/04/2005. 
79 Interview, MP F, Ankara, 22/04/2005. 
80 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
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Fame 
[73] Some people have been nominated candidates mainly because of their fame, for their 
contribution to the party’s public image, notably during the campaigns - this is the case of some 
artists, writers, or singers (Günay 2005). But how does fame shape their role-orientation as MPs? 
Fame shapes public expectations towards MPs and can increase the demands they are subjected to, 
since people would first go to them. The scope of their fame therefore orientates the audiences with 
whom they are in contact with: ‘The fact that I am well known in my constituency, well, the circle of 
my relatives is very broad... Besides their demands, I got very numerous demands from other voters 
in my constituency’81. ‘Because I was the general accountant of the party, the whole organisation 
called me. Every accountant of a subprovincial organisation, every provincial party leader knew me. 
Besides, people from my region have spread over Istanbul and Ankara, voters from Istanbul came to 
me, too, and they connected to relatives or people who knew me. All of them carried their problems 
to me’82. ‘Because I was in the university before, I have a great amount of students. Their children 
and grandchildren have grown up now. And many people know me from the television, from other 
places. They are neither from [my place of birth] nor from [my constituency] (…). Here, I speak 
everyday to 100 or 150 people in average’83. Therefore, the scope of fame can lead MPs to be more 
or less constituency-oriented. 
[74] However, fame can also provide MPs with more ability to get positive answers to the 
demands: ‘Any bureaucrat whom I call in Turkey (...), well, 99% of them know my name. While he 
doesn’t know other MPs, he certainly knows me; in the private sector my name is well known, too 
(...). For this reason, as far as possible, they won’t reject my demands. When an MP calls, most of 
the time they don’t want to appear, they are busy somewhere else... but when I call, they certainly 
answer, well, they don’t run away from me’84. 
 
                                                 
81 Interview, MP A, Ankara, 02/11/2004. 
82 Interview, MP A, Ankara, 18/04/2005. 
83 Interview, MP I, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
84 Interview, MP I, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
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Social capital 
[75] Social relations can also be invested as a resource in parliamentary work. ‘I had some 
relations from the bureaucracy, after becoming MP an important part of these relations continued’85. 
MP F chose as an assistant somebody he knew from his experience as a bureaucrat, and who, as a 
member of the Prime Minister high supervision council, has access to much informations. Relational 
resources can be prioritised for getting information. They are, therefore, important for committee 
work; they can also be very much valorised in casework. MP I states that: ‘From time to time I could 
come to a result about employment by calling people in the private sector. I have such a circle in the 
private sector, acquaintances’86. Because of his former relations, he can get more positive answers to 
demands, and thus, possibly, gets more of them, and gets quite service-oriented87. 
[76] There is a specialisation process inside the parliament, which is related to the skills of 
MPs and the way they are valued. Some professional qualifications are not very much valued in 
parliamentary work (engineering, medicine, industry, commerce). Even if these competences are not 
applied in the parliamentary work, they can influence the role orientation of individual MPs. Some 
MPs active in the economic sector may for example act for the defence of private interests, also 
because the demands addressed to them would be more in that sense. MP M, who was the secretary 
general of the chamber of industry and commerce of his constituency during 7 years, has many 
contacts and demands from economic collective actors in his constituency and worked as an 
economic advisor of his party. 
[77] In some cases, MPs cannot get their professional or extra-parliamentary skills 
recognised and valorised in parliamentary work. It is the case of many MPs who are given no 
responsibility in relation to their competences and who are assigned to committees where they have 
neither special skill nor special interest (MPs B, E), which makes it difficult for them to get anything 
valorised: ‘I can’t say that I have been very useful to the Petition Committee’88. MP B’s opposition to 
his party was considered more important than his oratory skills, since the party did not entrust him 
                                                 
85 Interview, MP F, Ankara, 22/04/2005. 
86 Interview, MP I, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
87 Kalaycıoğlu argues that newcomer MPs have great difficulties in establishing relationships with the public bureaucracy 
and, hence, experience difficulty in providing benefits in exchange for votes (1995: 50). 
88 Interview, MP E, Ankara, 24/04/2005. 
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with speaking in the plenary. Therefore, it is only under certain conditions – the first one being loyalty 
to the party - that skills can be transformed into parliamentary resources. 
[78] These skills can be transformed into parliamentary and/or political resources during the 
mandate. Some of them may help to build good relations with parties, and MPs can achieve to 
appear as providing skills important for the parties. An example would be MP F. He has managed to 
be assigned to the Planning and Budget Committee in the second mid-term, although he was not a 
professional politician and had become a member of CHP quite recently. Both his expertise and his 
relations in the state apparatus have been valuable to committee work and appreciated by the party – 
even more so since he has stuck to the party line; they have been rewarded as such. Other skills can 
be transformed in a way to enhance social backing. Here, MP H is a case in point. The media are 
interested in getting and broadcasting information he collects while following cases of irregular 
proceedings: ‘You share that with your constituency, with national media, and in the end the people 
make the difference between those who work, those who provide service, and those who don’t work. 
That creates a confidence in the public opinion, and the information flow begins. Information flows to 
me from [my constituency] and from everywhere in Turkey: from the press, the NGOs, the mere 
citizens. This constitutes a very serious source for me. By using and cross-examining these 
informations, you become the contact person (…) My relations with the media are dense, and most of 
the time, positive’89. In this way, he reinforces his information sources, and therefore his resources to 
pursue such proceedings. By working with the media, he does not only build good relations with 
them, but also increases his fame and his public image as a defender against arbitrariness, which is 
an important political resource. While he had not been given any special power position at the 
beginning of the legislature, he begins to be well known and recognized in the general public, while 
working for his party.  
 
Social support 
[79] The last main resource an MP can lean on is grassroots support. How and how far does 
social backing influence the MPs’ role-orientation? Social support can impact on different 
parliamentary activities: it can influence legislative activities (discourses, motions of question, and law 
                                                 
89 Interview, MP H, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
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proposals), which can address specific problems of the constituency or some social groups’ interests. 
Social support can also have an effect on MPs’ casework politics and constituency service90, since an 
MP may feel obliged to reward or act as the representative of the people who helped for his election, 
be they constituents or not. Lastly, social support can influence the relation to the party. If the support 
is attached to an individual and not to any particular party, it makes the MPs less dependent on the 
party on which ticket they have been elected. In general, these MPs are hardly given power positions 
in parliament because they are less controllable, and they end up in preference roles – MP E is a 
case in point. 
[80] However, it seems that social backing has only an indirect influence on MPs’ role 
orientation, depending on MPs’ other resources and positions. More than the social backing MPs 
enjoy or not, what seems important in terms of role orientation is, rather, if they choose to reinforce it. 
Though good relations with the party is a resource few MPs are not dependent of – only those who 
think they can be elected without the support of a party -, MPs’ investment in social support seem 
much more differentiated.  
 
Changing valuations of social backing: institutional rules and parties 
[81] On the whole, the value of social backing as a resource has been undermined in the last 
decades. This is due to the changes introduced in institutional rules: first the 10% threshold, which 
makes the relation between social support and election a quite haphazard one; second, the 
candidate selection procedures. The declining use of primaries has put in the background support 
from the local party organisation and from the constituency. It is possible that the increased 
importance given to local support before 1980 (before the introduction of the 10% threshold and 
when party primaries where much more common) influenced the way MPs behaved towards their 
constituency – in terms of debt, reward, and investment - and their role orientation. Since our sample 
includes only one MP (A) who was elected through both party primaries and the preference system91, 
it is difficult to isolate the effects of these institutional rules on role orientation from other factors92.  
                                                 
90 More than half of the deputies Kalaycıoğlu surveyed in 1984 and 1988 reported that they spent the majority of their time 
on case work.  
91 In the 1991 legislative elections, it was possible for the voters to register a voice for a specific candidate, who by getting 
an endorsement from a minimum of 15% of the voters could be moved up to the top of the list (Kalaycıoğlu 1995: 46). In 
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[82] Indeed, MP A enjoyed very strong local support both from the party organisation and 
from constituents. After the primaries, he was the leading candidate on the list; the preference voting 
confirmed his place, since he gathered more than 19,000 votes (i.e. more than one third of the votes 
for the SHP). During the campaigns, he enjoyed much support from relatives and supporters. During 
his mandate, he cared very much about maintaining this social support. First, he kept a strong 
connection with the local party organization: ‘When I was an MP, the candidates I supported always 
won the elections’93. Second, he went often to his constituency and participated to private 
ceremonies there. Besides spending one or two months each summer there, ‘during the legislative 
year, I couldn’t go as often as I’d wished to, but as far as possible I went there twice or three times a 
month (...). I spared some time to go to [my constituency], I went around in the villages, I made a 
program district by district, I made district meetings (...) I went to one or two villages (...), I informed 
two weeks in advance about my coming (...), those who wanted could come there (…) we discussed 
and debated with them’94. He made discourses, including on the floor, related to his own 
constituency. ‘I brought much better services to [my constituency] (...), this was much recognized by 
the people, I followed up the issues as an MP, the demands for roads, drinkable water supply, 
schools, dam constructions (...) I tried to bring many services, I had caught a very good position in 
[my constituency]’95. In fact, an impressive number of plaques offered by his constituents and local 
hemşehri organisations to thank him are hanged on his home's walls96. What enabled him to bring 
services to his constituency was is positions in the party board, and as a minister for some time. MP 
A didn’t candidate at the next elections, because the system of primaries had been abandoned, and 
he had fallen in the internal opposition of the party. May be he thought he would not get a good place 
on the list and would not be elected. Therefore, he is a good example of an MP elected with strong 
social support in conditions encouraging it, and caring about this resource, which heavily shaped his 
role-orientation. Now, the designation of candidates by the headquarters often puts local support to 
the background. As MP C, interestingly enough from the same constituency puts it: ‘The MPs are 
gauged and chosen by the headquarters. You can have as good relations as you want with the local 
                                                                                                                                                                       
that legislature, Hazama found that parliamentarians spend for constituency service the largest part of the time at their 
own disposal (Hazama 2005: §13).  
92 For MP C, the designation process was a mixture: first, candidates entering the election were designated by primaries; 
then, the party headquarters decided about their ranking on the list. 
93 Interview, MP A, Ankara, 02/11/2004. 
94 Interview, MP A, Ankara, 02/11/2004. 
95 Interview, MP A, Ankara, 02/11/2004. 
96 Observation, MP A’s home, 18/04/05. 
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apparatus, there is no point in it! There is no point in investing in local politics nor in the local 
apparatus, nobody expect such a thing from you’97.  
[83] Not only election rules, but parties also value differently the MPs' social backing. Some 
parties encourage their deputies – or some of them – to engage heavily in constituency work in order 
to foster their relations with the masses, or to answer to personal demands in order to get more votes 
(Kocaoğlu 2003: 27). In some cases, constituency work is considered as party work, as MP M puts it: 
‘What I consider most important is… committee work and work in my constituency. Party work… in 
any case work constituency and committee work are all things that the party wants’98. MP J, also from 
the AKP, confirms that: his party organizes the relations between him and his constituents. The local 
organisation organizes visits to private houses, breakfasts, and meeting with the citizens; it also 
transmits the citizens’ demands and problems to him99.  
[84] However, others parties give much less importance to social backing. DSP seems to be 
a case in point, as a former MP puts it: ‘The DSP has such a special feature. It does not hold together 
the MPs and the organisation (…) They didn’t want organic relations between the MPs and the 
organisation (...) Whatever his region, besides being interested in the problems of his constituency, 
the main duty, the main responsibility of the MP is parliamentary activities (…) Because we had no 
delegate system, because there were no power relations with the local organisation, it was not 
necessary to create warm or close ties with the constituency or the organisation there, or to pay 
much attention to them (…). That relieved us. First, from the pressure of the local organisation. And it 
protected us from the demands and wishes of the voters. Giving priority to parliamentary work was a 
right understanding of Ecevit. That’s why it was also our priority’100. In another interview, he argues: 
‘That’s why I didn’t construct very close or very warm relations with the local organisation… as they 
could not exert much pressure on me’101. He elaborates on the consequences: ‘for example, I did not 
visit the neighbourhoods or the cities every time I went to my constituency. Anyway, the party did not 
expect that from us (…) They perceived that as being dangerous, as an attempt to reinforce one’s 
                                                 
97 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 15/04/2005. 
98 Interview, MP M, Ankara, 25/04/2005. 
99 Interview, MP J, Ankara, 25/04/05. 
100 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 15/04/2005. 
101 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
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local power’102. In that case, doing constituency service is opposed to answering the party’s 
expectations.  
[85] As a consequence, he went not very often to his constituency: ‘During the first year, I 
was going once a month or once in two months. The second year, it became few and far between, in 
the third year I didn’t go much, I went only four or five times. This was criticized a bit (…), the people 
want to see you’103. His legislative activities were not oriented towards getting more local backing. 
None of the law proposals he submitted dealt with constituency issues. His speeches dealt 
exclusively with universalistic topics: ‘In the group meetings (…), most MPs argued ‘in my 
constituency they need drinkable water, they need a road, there is a need for agricultural 
subventions’, things like that, but I was the only one making speeches about general political 
issues’104. As a consequence, ‘I can’t say that I have got a hospital built here and a school there’105. 
He used legislative tools accordingly: ‘Oral questions (…) are more greetings to the voter. Because 
TRT-3 broadcasts the whole plenary sessions, the more you appear on the pulpit, the better it is, 
what you say has no importance. I don’t have such trouble’106 Other factors may explain his role 
orientation, like the fact that he was nominated mainly because of his close relation to the party 
leader or his ‘value-orientation’ in part due to his professional background, and his social ascension 
which was also a kind of departure from his constituency: ‘However much I may be from there, I am a 
stranger to the people from my constituency (…). Some colleagues (…) have organic links to their 
constituency because they live there. I am from there, but I live in Ankara since 40 years. I have no 
direct organic link, even if I have relatives there’107. Suffice it to say here that the very relevance of 
investing in social support can differ according to the party priorities. It would be interesting to further 
research on what different parties expect from their MPs in terms of relation to social support.  
 
                                                 
102 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 15/04/2005. 
103 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
104 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
105 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 15/04/2005. 
106 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
107 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 15/04/2005. 
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The perceived need for social support: the presence of other resources 
[86] In these conditions, how does social support influence role-orientation? Local backing 
makes it easier to be put on electoral lists by a party. Even if electoral lists are formed by the party 
headquarters, some MPs perceive a need for local backing to reinforce both their chance for 
nomination by the party on a high place on the list and for re-election, or because they have other 
interests in the constituency. According to MP H, the CHP has conducted an opinion poll in his 
constituency before deciding about the candidates’ ranking108.  
[87] Do all MPs who have been elected with strong social backing adopt a constituency-
orientation and try to reinforce their support? It seems to depend on their other resources at hand. 
Social support is a resource which they can valorise, and sometimes need to, when they have no 
other. MP E is a case in point. In his constituency, both the AKP and the CHP had much less support 
than the national average. He was the last elected on his list; he actually got a seat because the 
threshold resulted in the overrepresentation of the party he ran for, CHP. Therefore, his position is 
not secure. Even more so since, after having sought to get a better place in CHP, he has turned to 
the party’s internal opposition and finally changed party. In his constituency, he enjoys quite a strong 
local backing, and says to have gathered individual, and not ideological or party vote - a view that is 
shared by most observers. However, his grassroots support is not enough to be elected as an 
independent. During his mandate, he tries to invest in social support. MP E cannot afford to reject the 
demands of his constituents, even less so because he has no special skill that he could turn into a 
parliamentary resource. When asked about his priority in parliament, he declares spending most of 
his time for ill people and constituents. He declares proudly being one of the MPs receiving most 
visits, and accepting them: ‘my door is open’. Even when a plenary session is about to begin, ‘my 
priority is the citizen’109. The great majority of motions of written questions he proposed deals with his 
constituency. He goes quite often to his constituency, at least twice a month; there, he enjoys strong 
local go-betweens, and participates to private ceremonies.  
[88] Many MPs elected with social support try to maintain it; but they do not all give priority to 
this dimension, depending on their other resources. MP H has strong ties to his constituency; he was 
born and has been living there. As a lawyer there, and a person very engaged in NGOs, he enjoys a 
                                                 
108 Interview, MP H, Ankara, 21/04/05. 
109 Interview, MP E, Ankara, 24/04/2005. 
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high social standing. In Parliament, drawing on his skills, he is about to construct fame on his own on 
general issues; however, he has no special position in his party, which he entered it just before the 
elections, and was the last elected on the list. As an MP, he keeps maintaining social support: about 
40% of his legislative activities address constituency issues. He goes there every week, since his 
family leaves there. He is not very active in responding to individual demands from constituents, but 
takes care of his links with local interest groups. In a slightly different manner, MP L from the majority, 
who was elected with social support, balances between loyalty to the party and representing their 
constituency’s interest. As he puts it: ‘When I make speeches about my constituency and there are 
deficiencies, I do opposition. I criticize and I expect a solution’110. However, he has never voted 
against the party line, which means that he would not endanger his relation to the party to enhance 
his constituency backing. 
[89] For some MPs elected with social support, this has less importance. It is the case of MP 
K, who has been elected six times MP since 1977; at that time, he had been designated by primaries, 
which was not the case any more after 1980. In 2002, he was the leading candidate in his 
constituency. He has been deputy chair of a party group in the 1980s and is the chair of an important 
committee in the current legislature. He argues that his priority in the Parliament is committee work. It 
seems that his high positions make him not very constituency-oriented. None of his legislative 
activities is linked with his constituency. Still, he goes quite often there and receives many visitors 
and demands from there. Therefore, the very fact of having been elected with social support does not 
directly link to a strong constituency-orientation. Rather, the effects of social backing depend on other 
resources at hand. 
[90] How about the MPs elected without strong social backing? It is interesting to note that 
those MPs (in our sample, MPs B, C, D, F, I, J) hardly adopt a strong constituency-orientation, but 
rather concentrate on reinforcing other resources. For example, MP F was elected without local 
backing. He was not born in Istanbul, and has lived there during twelve years only; he left Istanbul 
twenty years before being elected as its representative. The reason for his being elected from 
Istanbul is probably mere intra-party electoral strategy. He receives few demands from his 
constituents. The great majority of his legislative activities (numerous motions of written questions, 
law proposals) are not related to his constituency. Actually, the reason why the party has nominated 
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(at a good ranking) is not in order to be a representative of any constituency. His high position in the 
centre (both in the party leadership and as a member of the plan and budget committee) leads him 
not to feel the need to enhance any social backing. MP F is not an exception in this respect. ‘I haven’t 
made many question motions. These are greetings to the voters anyway. You ask to the minister of 
public works why the fountain in your village has not been finished, and then you go to your village 
and say that you’ve asked that. But I didn’t need those things, I don’t need the voters’111. When going 
to his constituency, the party organized his agenda, and he had contacts with the citizens through the 
party organization. It seems that social support is a resource that is invested by MPs as a secondary 
choice or as a complement to other resources. Our hypothesis is that social support is an insecure 
resource, and enhancing it may appear more time and energy-consuming than, say, loyalty to the 
party.  
 
Ability and forms of enhancing social support 
[91] Lastly, even if they wish to, all MPs do not always have the means to enhance social 
support, especially as far as constituency service and casework are concerned. The ability and forms 
of reinforcing social support highly depend on the position of the MPs. It is easier to build social 
support through constituency service for majority MPs, or generally for those who have access to 
consistent resources. For MP K, who has been both in the opposition and in the majority during his 
long MP career: ‘when you are in the majority, you can do many things, you have many possibilities, 
from the hizmet point of view’112. Even for majority MPs, it is not always easy: ‘I had no chance of 
constructing a hospital in my constituency (…), of appointing doctors, or of opening a factory there: 
only a great MP has some chance to doing such things’113.  
[92] Expectations toward deputies differ consequently according to the type of constituency. 
Hazama (2005) found that the smaller the constituency size, the larger will be the demand for and the 
supply of constituency service. All MPs interviewed for this study said that MPs representing rural 
constituencies were more easily identifiable, had more personal relations to their constituents and 
personal demands from them. All of them also stated that MPs representing big cities got less social 
                                                 
111 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 27/04/05. 
112 Interview, MP K, Ankara, 21/04/2005. 
113 Interview, MP B, Ankara, 03/11/2004. 
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demands from their constituents, since they were more numerous and had much less direct relations 
with their constituents. But even if the number and nature of demands is correlated to the type of 
constituency, it does not determine role-orientation, i.e. how MPs manage and deal with these 
demands. Some MPs from rural constituencies are very reluctant toward visits and demands (MP B), 
whereas some MPs from big cities give them a good reception (MP I). 
[93] Still, the ability and forms of building social support do depend on the type of 
constituency. For an MP, answering to the requests from his constituents, appearing as a guest at 
meetings, special events, openings and so on at the local level, which provide excellent opportunities 
to make visible public appearance, is easier and more efficient in a small constituency. We should 
recall that in the 2002 elections, the number of votes necessary to get an MP seat in Istanbul was 
143,124, and only 46,792 in Tunceli (Massicard 2003: 2). It is also easier to appear in local media in 
relatively small constituencies. On the contrary, MPs from big cities are faced with less direct 
representative duties. But the downside is that these MPs have a much harder time than their 
colleagues from smaller constituencies to get their names and pictures into the newspapers on a 
regular basis or to answer the demands in a way that can bring sizeable social support. In a 
constituency like Istanbul, it is very difficult to build a local base. Therefore, it appears more efficient a 
strategy to build grassroots support in a small constituency.  
[94] Does it mean that an MP elected without social support in a big city cannot built any? It 
seems necessary to distinguish different types of social support. MP D is a case in point. He has 
made a political career mainly in Europe, where he had lived since more than 30 years, so he has 
neither local backing, nor much links to his constituency, Istanbul, where he has never lived. Besides, 
he is in the opposition; therefore he receives few individual demands. However, it does not mean that 
he is not oriented toward social support at all, but he tries to enhance one kind of it. He is well known 
as an activist abroad for a political cause. Since he is back in Turkey, he also acts as an intermediary 
between the NGOs in this field and his party. He gets demands, and is in contact to, mainly those 
NGOs, who often turn to him. He also brings this issue into the Parliament through numerous 
discourses. The CHP confirms his role by entrusting him with discourses on this topic. Thus, he tends 
to adopt an issue-oriented role. Therefore, it seems that MPs having no strong local backing are 
more involved in cooperating with organized or collective interests, rather than dealing with 
constituency relations and rendering personal services. MP C for example answers to the question 
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about his activities when he goes to his constituency, Istanbul, that he attends congresses, political 
meetings, and meetings organized by NGOs or by labour unions114. In the same manner, MP F gets 
few individual demands, since he is in the opposition, his constituency is Istanbul and he has no 
social backing there. But the fact that he is member of the Plan and Budget Committee brings him 
many visits of organized interests, since some committee decides on the allocation of many 
resources. Answering to the question if he got visitors came because he was a member of this 
committee, he said: ‘they represent the majority [of the visits I get] in fact. As a member of the Plan 
and Budget Committee, when a law is being discussed, the parties certainly come to me, or 
sometimes some NGOs linked to them. (…) They bring their own problems and want that their views 
be defended during the discussion of the bill’115. Other MPs who are members of important 
committees receive many visits related to their legislative activities, that represent collective interests 
(MPs I, K, L); therefore, proximity to the party may open the way to a role of mediation of collective 
interests. Finally, MPs who were elected with social support from local NGOs – like professional 
chambers - (MPs G, H, L, M) also maintain contacts with these local organized interests during their 
mandates. MP G, a long-time party member and local leader who made a career in professional 
organizations and NGOs, receives few individual demands, and does not take much care of them. In 
his constituency, he has contacts first and foremost with party organisations, local authorities, and 
NGOs. In contrast, he does not privilege participating in private ceremonies. In general, it appears 
handier to maintain types of social support with which one has been elected, than to build new ones. 
[95] In that sense, it seems important to make a difference between social support from 
individuals and attached to the person (as is the case for MP E). It seems that answering to individual 
demands from constituents and acting as an intermediary with collective and organized interests (be 
they local or more policy-oriented) are very different in terms of role-orientation, and are perceived as 
such by MPs: ‘I interrupted the opportunist visits. I made them understand that I could nothing for 
them and they saw that I did not handle their cases. But there were also people coming to me for 
general issues like democratisation or human rights. For example, when there were privatisations, 
but not for nominations in a position. In that case, I tried to help them’116. MPs elected without 
personal social backing seemt to be more likely to end up mediating with organized and collective 
                                                 
114 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 29/10/2004. 
115 Interview, MP F, Ankara, 22/04/2005. 
116 Interview, MP C, Istanbul, 27/04/2005. 
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interests than with individual demands, which in a sense makes them more dependent on their 
parties.  
 
Conclusion 
[96] Different factors influence role-orientation of MPs, and there are sometimes 
contradictions between them, possibly resulting in role conflict. I found in my sample interesting 
cases of role distance, i.e. of deputies having to play roles that contradict their self-perceptions. We 
also found cases of role inadequacy, of MPs who, because of their resources and values, would not 
act according to an important part of the expectations toward them, like MP B with his constituents’ 
demands. At the end of this exploratory study, I cannot put directly in relation with one another the 
different factors which would to build coherent profiles. To be able to develop a model of precise 
roles, better and more systematic data than those currently available are needed.  
[97] In the meantime, I would assert, as this study shows, that role orientation is very much 
constrained by the resources of MPs. Now, how should a hierarchy of factors be framed? At which 
point do an MP’s personal preferences begin to shape central elements of his role as a 
representative? Are institutional factors or individual resources more important for determining the 
role orientation? It seems that the relationship with the party does strongly influence positions, 
strategies and abilities of MPs, therefore role-orientation. 
[98] Finally, there seem to be a role specialisation process, driven both by parties and by 
MPs themselves. Parties play a crucial role in the selection of political personnel, since they value 
different profiles, skills, and resources of MPs: they need connections with the masses, public 
representatives to have a good image, specialists in negotiation; they divide parliamentary labour 
accordingly. Our hypothesis is that through these processes there is a partial and selective 
professionalisation of political personnel. In order to check it, it would be interesting to relate MPs’ 
longevity to the resources at their disposal.  
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Appendix 1: MPs interviewed for this study 
 Legislature Party Profession Duration of party 
membership 
before election 
Responsibilities in 
party group during 
legislature 
Ministerial 
experience 
Constituency Committee 
A 20 SHP 
(power) 
Engineer 16 years Party board Yes East-Central 
Anatolia  
Was born and had 
lived and worked in 
constituency for a 
long time 
1&2 Public works; 
European Economic 
Community 
B 21 DSP 
(power) 
Doctor 
(continues 
partly during 
mandate) 
0 year No No East-Central 
Anatolia 
Was born and had 
in part grown up in 
constituency, but 
had hardly lived 
there 
1. Foreign Affairs 
2. No permanent 
committe 
C 21 ANAP 
(power) 
Trade-
unionist 
8 years 
Provincial vice-
chairman 
Member of the party 
discipline committee 
No Istanbul 
Was not born in 
constituency, but 
had lived there 
during a decades 
before election 
1&2 Health, Family, 
Labour and Social 
Affairs 
(spokesperson) ; 
Human Rights 
(vice-chairman); 
European Union 
Integration 
D 22 CHP 
(opposi
tion) 
Trade-
Unionist 
6 years 
Had been a 
member of a party 
abroad since 31 
years before 
Member of the party 
assembly 
No Istanbul 
Was not born in 
constituency and 
had never lived or 
worked there before 
election 
1&2 No permanent 
committee, but 
European working 
groups 
E 22 CHP, 
indepe
ndant, 
other 
party 
Farmer 
(continues 
during 
mandate) 
6 years No No South-Eastern 
Anatolia 
Was born, has 
grown up and 
worked in 
constituency 
1. Petition (not 
wished) 
2. vice-chairman of 
committee 
F 22 CHP 
(opposi
tion) 
High 
bureaucrat 
3 years – he was 
contacted to run for 
the 1999 elections 
Party executive 
committee until 
2003; then member 
of the party 
assembly 
No Istanbul 
Was not born in 
constituency, but 
had worked there 
during 12 years 
before election 
1. No permanent 
committee 
2. Plan and Budget 
G 22 CHP 
(opposi
tion) 
Lawyer 35 
Has been provincial 
chairman many 
times, and member 
of the party 
executive 
committee before 
No No Mediterranean 
Was born, has in 
part grown up and 
always worked in 
constituency  
1. Justice 
2. Constitution 
H 22 CHP 
(opposi
tion)  
Lawyer 0 year No No South-Central 
Anatolia 
Was born, has 
grown up and 
1&2 Constitution  
committee 
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always worked in 
constituency  
I 22 AKP 
(power) 
Academic 1 year Party ombudsman 
at the beginning of 
legislature  
No Istanbul  
Was not born there, 
but has lived and 
worked there for 
decades before 
election 
1&2 Committee 
chairman 
J 22 AKP 
(power) 
Lawyer 1 year Member of the party 
national executive 
committee 
Yes Istanbul  
Was not born there, 
but has lived there 
for fourteen years 
before election 
1. Justice  
2. Constitution 
K 22, 5 other 
legislatures 
before; 
experience in 
local 
government 
AKP 
(power) 
Other 
parties 
before, 
both 
majority 
and 
oppositi
on 
Lawyer 1 year (AKP) but 
other parties before 
15 years between 
first party 
membership and 
first election as MP 
Has been provincial 
party leader 
Yes, in former party 
and legislature 
Responsibility in 
political group in 
former legislature 
Yes, three 
times in 
former 
legislatures 
Black Sea 
Was not born there 
(but in neighbouring 
province), but has 
worked there during 
decades 
 
1&2 Committee 
Chairman 
L 22, one other 
legislature 
before  
AKP 
(power) 
Elected 
MP of 
another 
party 
before, 
in 
power 
for 
some 
time 
Doctor 1 year (AKP) 
Other party 
membership before 
(about 10 years) 
About 4 years 
between first party 
membership and 
first election 
Has been member 
of a group 
leadership in 
previous legislature  
No North-Eastern 
Anatolia 
Was born in 
constituency, has 
grown up in part 
there, but has 
moved out for 
university and has 
never returned 
there 
1. & 2. Plan and 
Budget 
M 22 AKP 
(power) 
Businessma
n 
1 year (AKP) 
Other party 
membership before 
during 3 years 
Party provincial 
vice-chairman 
Had been a 
member of the 
provincial board of 
another party before 
(1998-2001)  
No North-Central 
Anatolia 
Was born in 
constituency, has 
grown up in part 
there, has lived and 
worked there. 
1. No permanent 
committee but 
specialized working 
group in party 
headquarters 
2. Plan -Budget 
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Appendix 2: follow-up form of a political group for citizens’ demands 
 
 
